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Article 3

Terri Schiavo: Unsettling The Settled
Lois Shepherd*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the early months of 2005, Terri Schiavo's story captured the
national public spotlight in ways reminiscent of Karen Ann Quinlan in
the 1970s and Nancy Beth Cruzan in the 1980s. All were young women
whose lives were tragically altered by traumatic events that left them in
what we now call a permanent vegetative state.' Their fates were
* D'Alemberte Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. I wish to thank the
Loyola Law Journal for inviting me to the symposium where I presented this paper. The
presentations of the other commentators and the questions and comments of the audience were
very insightful and helpful. I also wish to thank Norman Cantor, Barbara Noah, Kathy
Cerminara, Mary Crossley, and Mark Hall for discussing several of the issues presented in this
paper in ways that were especially helpful to me. Thanks also must go to Barbara Chrisman and
Megan Morley for their excellent research assistance.
1. In 1972, two doctors adopted the term "persistent vegetative state" to describe patients who
had entered a continuing state of unconsciousness marked by periods of wakefulness. Bryan
Jennett & Fred Plum, PersistentVegetative State After Brain Damage:A Syndrome in Search of a
Name, LANCET, Apr. 1972, at 734-37. Since then, those both inside and outside the medical
community have adopted the term, but it has come to denote a permanent rather than merely a
continuing or persistent condition. BRYAN JENNETr, THE VEGETATIVE STATE: MEDICAL FACTS,
ETHICAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS 4-5 (2002). The term "permanent vegetative state" more
accurately describes the condition and may be gaining ground, although a number of statutes that
refer to the vegetative state in its permanent condition still use the term "persistent vegetative
state." See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.101(12) (2004) (defining "persistent vegetative state" as "a
permanent and irreversible condition of unconsciousness in which there is: (a) The absence of
voluntary action or cognitive behavior of any kind. (b) An inability to communicate or interact
purposefully with the environment."). In this paper, I use the term "permanent vegetative state"
to refer to the condition at issue, which is the variant of vegetativeness that is considered
irreversible. It should be noted that a number of commentators have protested the use of the term

"vegetative" as demeaning because of its suggestion that the patient is something less than a
person, a mere "vegetable." See, e.g., Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Some Observations on PostComa UnawarenessPatientsand on Other Forms of Unconscious Patients:Policy Proposals, 16

MED. & L. 451, 461 (1997) ("[T]he term 'vegetative' dehumanizes the patients, suggesting that
we speak of some form of sub-human life."); Adam J. Hildebrand, Masked Intentions: The
Masquerade of Killing Thoughts Used to Justify Dehydrating and Starving People in a
"Persistent Vegetative State" and People with Other Profound Neurological Impairments, 16

ISSUES L. & MED. 143, 149 (2000) (arguing that the term is "an insult to the inherent dignity of
the human person"). While I am sympathetic to this argument, the terminology has become so
widespread that using a different term may cause confusion, because no alternative has yet
achieved significant use.
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publicly and vigorously debated in court and in the media.'
The
controversies surrounding Quinlan and Cruzan generated landmark
court rulings, but the legacy of the Schiavo controversy is still unclear.
The Schiavo controversy did not significantly further or change endof-life decision-making law, at least not in immediate or obvious ways.
Although Terri Schiavo's parents, Mary and Robert Schindler, fought
against the removal of their daughter's feeding tube with just about
every conceivable legal argument and exhausted every conceivable

2. See JOSEPH & JULIA QUINLAN WITH PHYLLIS BATTELLE, KAREN ANN: THE QUINLANS
TELL THEIR STORY (1977) (describing throughout the book the media and public interest over the
fate of Karen Ann Quinlan); WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE DEATHS OF NANCY
CRUZAN (2002) (describing throughout the book the media and public interest in the Cruzan
case); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Schiavo's Legacy: A National Debate; Ethics, Medicine and Politics
Collide, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 1, 2005, News, at 1 ("The life and death of Terri Schiavo
intensely public, highly polarizing and played out around the clock on the Internet and television
has become a touchstone in American culture.").
3. In In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, held that Karen Quinlan had a federal constitutional
right to privacy to terminate life-sustaining treatment and that Quinlan's father could act on his
daughter's behalf to order removal of the ventilator that aided her respiration. In Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court, while upholding Missouri's
requirement that Cruzan's feeding tube could not be removed absent clear and convincing
evidence that she would want it removed, stated that a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment could be inferred from the Court's prior decisions. Id. at 278. Many have
interpreted Cruzan to establish a constitutional "right to die," if not with assistance, then by
withdrawal of unwanted treatment. See In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990) (citing
Cruzan for the proposition that, "[a] competent individual has the constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment regardless of his or her medical condition"); BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1359 (5th ed. 2004) (pointing out that,
"Many authoritative sources presumed that the opinion did recognize a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in a competent person to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Indeed .... the case
was hailed by the New York Times as the first to recognize a right to die."). Cruzan is also cited
for the proposition that artificial nutrition and hydration should be considered like other medical
treatments that can be withheld or withdrawn according to a patient's wishes, a principle that state
courts have uniformly adopted since the Cruzan case. See, e.g., Browning, 568 So. 2d at 11
(citing Cruzan and numerous other court decisions in support of its statement that "Courts
overwhelmingly have held that a person may refuse or remove artificial life-support, whether
supplying oxygen by a mechanical respirator or supplying food and water through a feeding
tube."); MARK H. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 507 (6th ed. 2003) ("The
Cruzan case essentially resolved the debate [whether artificial nutrition and hydration could be
discontinued] in terms of the law, and now it is widely accepted that patients can refuse any
medical treatment."). It is important to note, however, as other commentators have, see, for
example FURROW, supra; HALL, supra; DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra, that the majority opinion in
Cruzan states that the right to refuse unwanted treatment may be inferred from prior decisions of
the Court, but does not explicitly recognize such a right. In fact, scholars Alan Meisel and Kathy
L. Cerminara state that "Cruzan has ... had virtually no effect on the case law." ALAN MEISEL
& KArHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISION MAKING §
6.03[G][4][b] (3d ed. 2005). Meisel and Cerminara also, however, note that following Cruzan a
number of state legislatures moved to loosen restrictions on the removal of artificial nutrition and
hydration. Id.
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avenue of relief, appealing to all three branches of government at both
state and federal levels and also offering private settlement, they
Circuit Court Judge Greer's original order in
ultimately failed.
February 2000 that Terri Schiavo's feeding tube should be removed in
accordance with Florida law ultimately withstood attack.4 Michael
Schiavo, Terri Schiavo's husband, presented evidence that Terri
Schiavo would not want to continue living in a permanent vegetative
state by means of a feeding tube and thus convinced Judge Greer that
removal of the feeding tube was proper. Even in the face of legislative
and executive insistence, other courts, both at the state appellate level
and the federal level, refused to undo that determination. 5 Thirteen days
after the third and final removal of her feeding tube, Terri Schiavo died
on March 31, 2005.6
Cases such as Quinlan and Cruzan remain good law following the
Schiavo controversy, as do the many others that have established the
constitutional and common law rights of an incompetent individual to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment, including the right to withdraw
Likewise, Florida's statutory
artificial nutrition and hydration.7
apparatus for making decisions to withdraw life-sustaining treatment,
developed in the wake of Quinlan, Cruzan, and similar Florida cases,
remains intact. Though the Schiavo controversy did not create any
broad new pronouncements of law or produce lasting legislation, it did
unsettle a number of legal and ethical issues that might have previously
appeared settled.
End-of-life decision-making law appeared almost quiet before the
Schiavo case. Commentators and activists in this field had moved on to

4. In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11,2000) (order
allowing the removal of Terri Schiavo's feeding tube pursuant to Florida statute and Michael
available
at
proxy),
Terri
Schiavo's
as
Schiavo's
directions
http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/02 1100-Trial Ct Order 200200.pdf [hereinafter Schiavo
Original 2000 Order]; see also infra Part II (detailing the development of the Schiavo case
including the fact that the feeding tube was ultimately removed).
5. See infra notes 49-84 (discussing the appellate history of the Schiavo case).
6. See Schiavo Case Resources, http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/timeline.htm (last
visited Jan. 6, 2006) (providing a timeline of Terri Schiavo's life).
7. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987) (finding the right to refuse
medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration, is protected under United States
Constitution, Arizona Constitution, and common law right to be free from bodily invasion);
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (allowing, in the first
reported case, withdrawal of nutrition and hydration; doctors not criminally liable for following
family's wishes to discontinue artificial nutrition and hydration from man in "a deeply comatose
state from which he was not likely to recover."); In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990)
(holding that the constitutional right of privacy embraces the right to refuse all artificial means of
life-support).
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issues of physician-assisted suicide, palliative care, and suits for

wrongful living. 8 Change, however, may be forthcoming, based on the

number and intensity of challenges that the Schindlers and their
supporters leveled at that law, both as it exists on the books and as it
was applied in the Schiavo case. 9 While the Schiavo case was pending,
Florida considered (but did not pass) legislation that would have made it
much more difficult to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration than
other forms of medical treatment. 10 Influenced by the Schiavo case,
other states also have recently considered legislation to change 1 1their
standards for withdrawing treatment from incompetent individuals.
Even if the statutory law remains largely unchanged, will courts,
proxies, physicians, and hospitals make decisions about end-of-life
treatment in different ways because of what happened in the Schiavo
case? For example, will courts insist on more definitive evidence of
patients' wishes before allowing treatment withdrawal? Will health
care providers insist more often that family member surrogates get a
court order before removing feeding tubes? Will more proxies or
family members challenge the diagnosis of permanent vegetative state?
And what will the future hold with respect to government involvement
in these cases? Will state governors more often direct those who protect
individuals with disabilities to protest family decisions to withdraw

treatment?
This article provides a brief summary of the facts in the Terri Schiavo

8. See, for example Symposium, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Facing Death After Glucksberg
and Quill, 82 MINN. L. REV. 885 (1998); A Symposium on Physician-AssistedSuicide, 35 DuQ.
L. REV. 1 (1996); Books: Review Symposium on Euthanasiaand Physician-AssistedSuicide, 25 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 377 (2000) for articles related to euthanasia. See, for example,
Symposium, Appropriate Management of Pain: Addressing the Clinical, Legal, and Regulatory
Barriers,24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 285 (1996); Symposium, Legal and Regulatory Issues in Pain
Management, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 265 (1998); Symposium, The Undertreatmentof PainLegal, Regulatory and Research Perspectives and Solutions, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 11 (2001)
for numerous articles on pain and comfort. See, for example, Adam M. Milani, Better Off Dead
than Disabled? Should Courts Recognize a "Wrongful Living" Cause of Action when Doctors
Failto Honor Patients' Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149 (1997); S. Elizabeth
Wilbom, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment; Where There is a Right, There Ought to be a
Remedy, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 649 (1998) for articles discussing wrongful living suits and a cause of
action for violation of a patient's right to chose to forego medical treatment. See generally,
Compassion & Choices, http://www.compassionandchoices.org/aboutus/timeline.php (last visited
Jan. 9, 2006) (detailing "MILESTONES in the modem choice in dying movement").
9. See infra Part H (describing the various legal and media challenges attempted during the
Schiavo controversy).
10. See infra notes 61, 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing Florida legislation enacted in
response to the Terri Schiavo situation and subsequent legislation proposed in Florida).
l1. See infra note 155 (listing proposed legislation in various states).
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controversy. 12 Then it addresses some of the many questions that her
case raises. 13 These questions are clustered around three topics: the role
of surrogate decision-making in cases of permanent vegetative state; the
relevance of the physical condition of the patient in questions of
treatment refusal; and the significance of artificial nutrition and
hydration as the kind of treatment refused.
14
II. FIFTEEN YEARS IN A PERMANENT VEGETATIVE STATE

Theresa Marie Schiavo was twenty-seven years old when she
suffered cardiac arrest on a February morning in 1990. Her husband of
five and a half years, Michael Schiavo, found her in the hallway in their
apartment around five a.m. and called 911.15 Paramedics performed
16
CPR, and after seven attempts at defibrillation, restored her heartbeat.
Terri Schiavo was
taken to a local hospital and never again regained
17
consciousness.
Initially, she entered into a coma. 18 A coma is a temporary state of
unconsciousness that resembles sleep, but from which an individual
cannot be roused.1 9 After some period of time, a patient in a coma will
either die without ever recovering consciousness, will recover either
20
complete or partial consciousness, or will enter a vegetative state.
Terri Schiavo's condition progressed from a coma to a vegetative state.
A vegetative state is a unique condition in which the individual has no

12. See infra Part H1(setting forth Terri Schiavo's story and the legal steps taken in reaction to
it).
13. See infra Part m (discussing three significant questions raised by Terri Schiavo's
situation).
14. The following summary of the facts of the Terri Schiavo controversy was compiled from a
number of helpful sources. These sources include: the various court documents filed in the case;
JAY WOLFSON, GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR THERESA MARIE SCHIAVO, A REPORT TO GOVERNOR
SCHIAVO
(2003),
IN
THE
MATTER
OF
THERESA
MARIE
JEB
BUSH
http://www.miami.edu/ethics2/schiavo/wolfson's%20report.pdf [hereinafter WOLFSON REPORT];
Joan Didion, The Case of Theresa Schiavo, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, June 9, 2005;
Abstract Appeal: The First Web Log Devoted to Florida Law & the Eleventh Circuit Court of
(last visited Jan. 6, 2006)
Appeals, http://www.abstractappeal.com/schiavo/infopage.html
(including information regarding the legal circumstances surrounding the Terri Schiavo case);
Schiavo Case Resources, supra note 6 (providing a timeline of Terri Schiavo's life).
15. Didion, supra note 14, at 60.
16. Id.
17. Schiavo Original 2000 Order, supra note 4, at 2.
18. WOLFSON REPORT, supra note 14, at 7.
19. The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative
State-Firstof Two Parts, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1501-02 (1994) [hereinafter Task Force
Report, Part 1].
20. Id. at 1502 (listing the three possible outcomes for coma patients).
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consciousness but is not in a sleeplike state of coma. 2 1 In a vegetative
state a patient has sleep-wake cycles, her eyes will open, she can have
some movement of her limbs, but she is nevertheless completely
unaware of her surroundings. A person in a vegetative state has no
thoughts or feelings, no pain or perception, and only reflexive
movements and autonomic functions regulated by the still-functioning
brain stem.22 A vegetative condition is diagnosed according to clinical
observation.2 3 If a person does enter a vegetative state, it can be
diagnosed with a high degree of certainty as being permanent twelve
months following a traumatic brain injury (such as from a fall) and after
three months when the cause of the condition is non-traumatic (such as
loss of oxygen to the brain from
cardiac arrest).24 Recovery after these
25
rare.
time periods is extremely
In the months following Terri Schiavo's cardiac arrest, Michael
Schiavo and Terri's parents, Mary and Robert Schindler, were active
partners in her care. According to a guardian ad litem's report filed in
2003, during this period of time "[t]here was no question but that
complete trust, mutual caring, explicit love and a common goal of
caring for and rehabilitating Theresa, were the shared intentions of
Michael Shiavo [sic] and the Schindlers." 2 6 For a few weeks in 1990,
Terri's family brought her home to care for her, but they found her
27
needs overwhelming and she was returned to a skilled care facility.
She spent the remainder of her life in such facilities, hospitals, or
hospice. Michael Schiavo took his wife to California for several
21. JENNETT, supra note 1,at 3-5 (setting forth definitional and clinical features of persistent
vegetative state in adults); see also Am. Neurological Ass'n Comm. on Ethical Affairs, Persistent
Vegetative State: Report of the American NeurologicalAssociation Committee on Ethical Affairs,
33 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 386, 386 (1993) (distinguishing between a coma and a vegetative state);
Task Force Report, Part I, supra note 19, at 1499-1500 (setting forth the history and the current
meaning of persistent vegetative state).
22. JENNETr, supra note 1, at 18-19 (discussing medical opinions regarding pain and
awareness in the vegetative state patient). As Bryan Jennett, who, along with Fred Plum coined
the term "vegetative" explains,
in the Oxford English dictionary... vegetative is used to describe "an organic body
capable of growth and development but devoid of sensation and thought." It suggests
even to the layman a limited and primitive responsiveness to external stimuli, whilst it
reminds the doctor that there is relative preservation of autonomic regulation of the
internal milieu of the body.
Id. at 4.
23. See Task Force Report, Part I, supra note 19, at 1500.
24. Id. at 1499.
25. JENNETT, supra note 1, at 57-65 (discussing data on recovery, late recovery and
prediction of recovery).
26. WOLFSON REPORT, supra note 14, at 8.
27. Id.
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months in 1990 so that she could receive aggressive rehabilitative
28
therapy and even an experimental stimulator implant in her brain.
Periodic medical examinations revealed no improvement.
In 1992, Michael Schiavo sued the doctors who had been treating
Terri Schiavo for infertility before her cardiac arrest. He alleged that
the cardiac arrest was caused by a potassium imbalance linked to her
dietary habits and bulimia.2 9 A jury found that Terri Schiavo's doctors
were negligent in failing to diagnose her condition; the case settled upon
appeal and resulted in an award of $300,000 for Michael Schiavo for
loss of consortium and $750,000 in economic damages for Terri
The money awarded to Terri Schiavo was placed in a trust
Schiavo.
for her continued care. An independent trustee was responsible for the
trust funds, over which Michael Schiavo had no control. 3 1 He would,
however, inherit the money if she died. If he divorced her, then the
Schindlers would inherit the money when she died.
It was around the time of the resolution of the lawsuit that Michael
Schiavo and Mary and Robert Schindler fell out of friendship. The
cause of this falling out is a matter of great dispute. 32 Though not
relevant to the legal and ethical questions explored in this article, the
animosity between Michael Schiavo and the Schindlers became a very
public matter and colored people's views about who was really looking

Id. at 9.
The guardian ad litem report notes:
The cause of the cardiac arrest was adduced to a dramatically reduced potassium level
in Theresa's body. Sodium and potassium maintain a vital, chemical balance in the
human body that helps define the electrolyte levels. The cause of the imbalance was
not clearly identified, but may be linked, in theory, to her drinking 10-15 glasses of
iced tea each day. While no formal proof emerged, the medical records note that the
combination of aggressive weight loss, diet control and excessive hydration raised
questions about Theresa suffering from Bulimia, an eating disorder, more common
among women than men, in which purging through vomiting, laxatives and other
methods of diet control becomes obsessive.
Id. at 8.
30. The Wolfson Report places the figure at $750,000 for economic damages, while the
original court order places the figure at $700,000. Id. at 9; Schiavo Original 2000 Order, supra
note 4, at 2.
31. WOLFSON REPORT, supra note 14, at 9.
32. Judge Greer writes in his original order about the cause of the falling out between Michael
Schiavo and the Schindlers in February 1993:
While the testimony differs on what may or may not have been promised to whom and
by whom, it is clear to this court that such severance [of the friendship] was predicated
upon money and the fact that Mr. Schiavo was unwilling to equally divide his loss of
consortium award with Mr. and Mrs. Schindler. The parties have literally not spoken
since that date.
Schiavo Original 2000 Order, supra note 4, at 2.
28.
29.
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out for Terri Schiavo's interests and who was motivated by their own
interests. Specifically, in the years that would follow, the Schindlers

repeatedly charged that Michael Schiavo was motivated by money to
end Terri's life.
The trial court found no basis for these charges and
would not remove Michael as Terri's guardian although repeatedly
asked to do so on the grounds of conflict of interest. 34 The Schindlers
also sought to remove Michael as guardian on the basis that he was not
properly caring for Terri and, later, because he was living with another

woman whom he called his "fianc6e" and with whom he had fathered
two children. 35 The court repeatedly concluded, however,
that Michael
36
Schiavo had been appropriately attentive to Terri's care.
In 1998, Michael Schiavo sought court approval for the removal of
his wife's feeding tube. 37 Because she could not orally ingest sufficient
quantities of food to sustain her body, Tern would die if doctors
removed her feeding tube. The withdrawal of artificial nutrition and

hydration from a person in a permanent vegetative state is permitted
under Florida law by a health care proxy 3 8 as long as the decision is the
33. Larry King Live: Interview with Mary, Robert Schindler (CNN television broadcast Sept.
27, 2004) (transcript available at http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0409/27/lkl.00.htm)
(during which Robert Schindler suggests Michael Schiavo may have been motivated to end Terri
Schiavo's life in order to secure for himself the funds remaining from malpractice award); see
also Anita Kumar & J. Nealy-Brown, Fund for Schiavo's Medical Care Dwindles, ST.
PETERSBURG
TIMES
ONLINE
TAMPA
BAY,
June
3,
2001,
http://www.sptimes.com/News/060301/TampaBay/Fund forSchiavo-s-me.shtml (detailing the
potential conflicts of interest created by the malpractice award).
34. In fact, in its original order, the trial court explained that both Michael Schiavo and the
Schindlers could be understood as having a conflict of interest in the decision-making process of
Terri Schiavo. Schiavo Original 2000 Order, supra note 4, at 2-3. If, through legal maneuvering,
the Schindlers were able to keep their daughter alive long enough that Michael Schiavo would
seek a divorce, then they would stand to inherit from her estate. See also Report of Guardian Ad
Litem, Richard L. Pearse, Jr. at 7-9, In re Schiavo, No. 90-290BGD-003 (F]. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29,
1998),
available
at
http://www.riami.edu/ethics/schiavo/122998%2OSchiavo%20Richard%20Pearse%20GAL%20re
port.pdf (describing an early failed attempt by the Schindlers to remove Michael Schiavo as
guardian and crediting their concern about his actual or at least apparent conflict of interest).
35. See Jamie Thompson, She's the Other Woman in Michael Schiavo's Heart, ST.
PETERSBURG
TIMES
ONLINE
TAMPA
BAY,
Mar.
26,
2005,
http://www.sptimes.com/2005/03/26/news-pf/Tampabay/She-s-the otherwoman.shtm
(discussing Michael Schiavo's relationship with his live-in girlfriend).
36. See, e.g., Schiavo Original 2000 Order, supra note 4, at 3-4 (noting that Michael Schiavo
had taken his wife to California for experimental treatment, had been aggressive with nursing
home personnel, and was otherwise very attentive to her care). Jay Wolfson, in his 2003 guardian
ad litem report notes "[Michael's] demanding concern for [Terri's] well being and meticulous
care by the nursing home earned him the characterization by the administrator as 'a nursing home
administrator's nightmare'. It is notable that through more than thirteen years after Theresa's
collapse, she has never had a bedsore." WOLFSON REPORT, supra note 14, at 10.
37. Schiavo Original 2000 Order, supra note 4, at 1, 4.
38. Under Florida law, a health care proxy is a person designated by statute to make decisions
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one that the patient would make or the withdrawal of treatment is in the
patient's best interests. 39 By Florida statute, Michael Schiavo was his
wife's proxy because she had not designated anyone prior to her
incapacity. The statutory law of Florida, like that of other states,
establishes a hierarchy of family members to step in as proxy with the
power to make certain medical treatment decisions for patients. 404 1 In
certain circumstances, proxies may decide to withdraw life support.
The withdrawal of feeding tubes from patients in a permanent
vegetative state takes place on a regular basis in hospitals and nursing
homes across the country without any court involvement. 42 State law
may even specify, as Florida's does, that court approval is not necessary

for an incapacitated person who has not executed an advance directive appointing someone to
serve as surrogate. As Kathy Cerminara explains, "This terminology contrasts with that used in
other states, in which persons making medical decisions for incapacitated persons without patient
appointment to such a position (... those who derive their authority from operation of law) are
called surrogates." Kathy L. Cerminara, Tracking the Storm: The Far-ReachingPower of the
Forces Propelling the Schiavo Cases, 35 STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at
n.3, on file with author). In this article, the terms are generally used interchangeably. When it is
relevant whether the agent was appointed by the patient or designated according to state, attention
is drawn to that distinction.
39. FLA. STAT. § 765.401(2), (3) (2004).
40. FLA. STAT. § 765.401(1) (2004). The following individuals may act as proxy in the
following order of priority: (a) the judicially appointed guardian of the patient; (b) the patient's
spouse; (c) an adult child of the patient or, if the patient has more than one adult child, a majority
of adult children; (d) a parent of the patient; (e) the adult sibling of the patient or, if the patient
has more than one sibling, a majority of the adult siblings; (f) an adult relative who has exhibited
special care and concern for the patient; (g) a close friend of the patient; (h) in some
circumstances, a clinical social worker. Id.
41. Id. As explained in more detail infra, the Florida statutes explicitly permit a proxy to
withdraw life support when the patient is in one of three conditions-a persistent vegetative
state, an end-stage condition, or is terminally ill, FLA. STAT. § 765.305(2)(b) (2004)-and there is
clear and convincing evidence that the patient would wish to be removed from life support in that
condition or the removal of life support would be in the patient's best interests. See infra notes
90-94 (discussing Florida statutes related to surrogate or proxy decision-making).
42. This seems to be a matter of common knowledge, rather than an issue that has been
statistically verified. See, e.g., Lee Benson, Schiavo Story Blown Far Our of Proportion,
DESERET MORNING NEWS, Apr. 4, 2005, at BO1 ("Every day, ventilators are shut off and feeding
tubes are removed in hospitals and hospices .. "); David C. Leven, Oregon Assisted-Dying Law
Should Stand, J. NEWS, Oct. 3, 2005, at 4B ("Every day, throughout the U.S., people decide, as
they legally can, to have feeding tubes removed or not inserted in the first place.. " ); see also
David Orentlicher & Christopher M. Callahan, Feeding Tubes, Slippery Slopes, and PhysicianAssisted Suicide, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 389, 402 (2004) ("The literature reports data on the number
of feeding tubes inserted, but we do not have data on the number of patients for whom feeding
was discontinued or never started."). It is, however, quite well settled that judicial review of such
decisions is not normally required. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 3.19 ("A presumption
against judicial review of decisions made by properly designated surrogates to forego lifesustaining treatment began to emerge beginning with the earliest end-of-life cases.... This
presumption is now well solidified.").
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prior to withdrawal of medical treatment. 43 Nevertheless, Michael
Schiavo was aware that the Schindlers disagreed with his decision to
remove Terri's feeding tube, and he asked the local probate court to
determine if the feeding tube should be removed. If he had not sought
court review, the Schindlers could have done so without Michael's
44
consent under the Florida procedures for end-of-life decision making.
The case was assigned to Circuit Judge George Greer, who would see
the case go through numerous permutations over seven years. After the
initial hearing, in which witnesses gave testimony, Judge Greer
determined that Terri Schiavo was "beyond all doubt... in a persistent
vegetative state" and that the medical evidence "conclusive'
establishes that she has no hope of ever regaining consciousness ....
A CAT scan introduced into evidence revealed that "to a large extent
her brain ha[d] been replaced by spinal fluid ....,,46 The trial court's
other central finding was that there existed clear and convincing
evidence that removal of the feeding tube was the decision Terri
Schiavo herself would make if she were competent. 4 7 This evidence
consisted of statements reportedly made by Terri Schiavo to her
husband, his brother, and his sister-in-law. The statements concerned
instances in which Terri would not want to continue living, and Terri
made those statements in response to the hospitalization of her
grandmother, the funeral of another relative, a television movie, and a
report or show on television regarding people on life support. 48 The
trial court ordered, on the basis of this evidence, that the feeding tube
should be removed.
Over the next year, the Schindlers unsuccessfully appealed this
original order, 49 and Terri Schiavo's feeding tube was clamped in April
43. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990) (stating that when a patient has expressed
his or her desires, a surrogate need not obtain prior judicial approval to carry out those desires,
including terminating life-sustaining measures).
44. FLA. STAT. § 765.105 (2004) (permitting the patient's family, health care facility,
attending physician, or other interested persons to seek expedited judicial intervention for review
of a surrogate or proxy's decision).
45. Schiavo Original 2000 Order, supra note 4, at 6.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 6, 8-10. The Florida statutes provide that a proxy's decision to withhold or
withdraw life-prolonging procedures "must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that
the decision would have been the one the patient would have chosen had the patient been
competent or, if there is no indication of what the patient would have chosen, that the decision is
in the patient's best interest." FLA. STAT. § 765.401(3) (2004).
48. Schiavo Original 2000 Order, supra note 4, at 9.
49. In re Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 180 (Schiavo 1) (Fla.Dist. Ct. App.) (affirming the Schiavo
Original 2000 Order), review denied sub nom. Schindler v. Schiavo ex. rel. Schiavo, 789 So. 2d
348 (Fla. 2001).
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2001, meaning that she stopped receiving nutrition and hydration
through the tube. 50 The Schindlers then filed a new legal action in a
different division of the circuit courts of Florida, requesting that the
removal of life support be enjoined. 5 1 A different judge, unfamiliar
with the case, reviewed the evidence under emergency review and
ordered feeding to be resumed. 52 Through a series of motions and
additional reviews at the appellate level, this request by the Schindlers
resulted in the unclamping of their daughter's feeding tube and a new
evidentiary hearing by Judge Greer as to her condition.
The purpose of the new hearing was to allow the Schindlers to
establish that new medical treatment offered significant promise of
improving Terri's condition such that Terri herself would have changed
her mind about discontinuing feeding, had she been capable of making
such a decision. 54 Five doctors submitted expert testimony on Terri
Schiavo's condition-two chosen by Michael Schiavo, two by the
Schindlers, and one by the court. 5 5 Judge Greer also viewed four-and-ahalf hours of videotape footage of Teri Schiavo, select portions of
which would later repeatedly air on national television. 56 Following the
hearing, Judge Greer ruled that "the credible evidence overwhelmingly
supports the view that Terry [sic] Schiavo remains in a persistent
vegetative state." 57 In addition, the Schindlers offered no testimony that
revealed treatment options that would significantly improve Terri's
quality of life.5 8 The court5 9consequently entered a new order to
withdraw Terni's feeding tube.
When court challenges in October 2003 to this second order were
unsuccessful, 60 the Schindlers and their many supporters among rightto-life and disability advocacy groups sought the intervention of Florida

50. In re Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 555 (Schiavo II) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
5 1. The Schindlers' tactics are discussed in some detail in the opinion of the Second District
Court of Appeal in Schiavo 11.Id.
52. Id. at 555-57.
53. In re Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640, 647-48 (Schiavo III) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (ordering
new hearing on medical evidence).

54. Id. at 645-47.
55. In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GB-003, 2002 WL 31817960, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 22,
2002) (circuit court decision denying the Schindlers' motion to reverse the original 2000 court
order and continue life-sustaining activities for Terri Schiavo).
56. Id. at *2-3.
57. Id. at *3.

58. Id. at *5.
59. Id.
60. In re Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182 (Schiavo IV) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied sub. nom.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla.2003).
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Governor Jeb Bush. Besieged by e-mails, letters, and telephone calls,
the Florida legislature rushed through special legislation specifically
dealing with Terri Schiavo's situation. This legislation allowed the
governor to issue a "stay" of the order allowing the feeding tube to be
withdrawn and permitted him to order the feeding tube's reinsertion,
which he did.61 The legislation, known as "Terri's Law," also provided
for appointment of a guardian ad litem to make recommendations to
Governor Bush and the court.
The actions of the Florida legislature and Governor Bush were
unprecedented. 62 Supporters of the governor's intervention likened it to
a "stay of execution." 63 From their perspective, Terri Schiavo was a
61.

The Florida legislation provided:
Section 1. (1) The Governor shall have the authority to issue a one-time stay to prevent
the withholding of nutrition and hydration from a patient if, as of October 15, 2003:
(a) That patient has no written advance directive;
(b) The court has found that patient to be in a persistent vegetative state;
(c) That patient has had nutrition and hydration withheld; and
(d) A member of that patient's family has challenged the withholding of nutrition and
hydration.
(2) The Governor's authority to issue the stay expires 15 days after the effective date
of this act, and the expiration of that authority does not impact the validity or the effect
of any stay issued pursuant to this act. The Governor may lift the stay authorized
under this act at any time. A person may not be held civilly liable and is not subject to
regulatory or disciplinary sanctions for taking any action to comply with a stay issued
by the Governor pursuant to this act.
(3) Upon the issuance of a stay, the chief judge of the circuit court shall appoint a
guardian ad litem for the patient to make recommendations to the Governor and the
court.
Section 2. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.
H.B.
35-E,
2003
Leg.,
Spec.
Sess.
(Fla.
2003),
available
at
http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/102003_HB35-E.pdf. "Terri's Law" was invalidated by
Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla.2004).
62. Although on previous occasions state officials have intervened in end-of-life disputes, they
have not had specific legislative backing such as that provided by Terri's Law. The closest
parallel appears to be the case of Hugh Finn, a Virginia man living in a permanent vegetative
state whose wife sought removal of artificial nutrition and hydration. The Governor of Virginia
vigorously opposed the trial court's order approving removal of artificial nutrition and hydration
and filed a separate lawsuit to that end, which ultimately failed. See Barbara A. Noah,
Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 107,
121-22 (2004), for a discussion of this intervention.
63. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, In Florida Right-to-Die Case, Legislation that Puts the
Constitution at Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A20 ("'It's beautifully badly drafted,' said
Patrick 0. Gudridge, a law professor at the University of Miami .... 'They wanted to use the
word stay,' Professor Gudridge said of the Legislature, 'because the analogy is to a stay of
execution."'); David Sommer, Advocacy Group Supports Schindlers in Court Fight, TAMPA
TRIB., Oct. 31, 2003, Metro, at 3 (quoting chief counsel for the American Center for Law and
Justice: "We think the Legislature and the governor have a role here.... The governor has the
right to stay executions ordered by the courts, and has a similar right to intervene when family
members disagree about life-ending decisions for loved ones who cannot speak for themselves.");
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severely disabled individual about to be cruelly starved to death, and
they believed she should be entitled to at least the protection afforded
those who had committed capital crimes. 64 Florida legislators appeared
largely out of their depth, both in their knowledge of existing Florida
law and constitutional ,precedent and in their understanding of the facts
surrounding the case.
But there was no time to lose if they were to
"save" Terri Schiavo. Debate on the floor of the legislature was intense,
including both political
grandstanding and emotional, sometimes even
66
tearful, good will.
Opponents of the legislation were aghast at the intrusion of the
67
legislature and executive into an individual's medical decisions.
Critics charged that the legislature and governor had unconstitutionally
invaded the province of the judiciary and violated constitutional due
process guarantees by singling out a particular and already adjudicated
case for reversal by special legislation. 68 There were also strong
criticisms that Governor Bush had essentially replaced Michael Schiavo
as Terri Schiavo's 69health care proxy and thus encroached on her
constitutional rights.
In 2004, the Florida Supreme Court declared "Terri's Law"
70
unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Terri Schiavo's feeding tube was once again set for removal, prompting
yet another legislative consideration of her situation. In early 2005, as

Cal Thomas, Editorial, Jeb Bush's Controversial Stay of Execution, AUGUSTA CHRON., Oct. 27,
2003, at A04 (likening the governor's power to intervene in capital cases to his power to
intervene in Schiavo controversy).
64. Sommer, supra note 63.
65. Liptak, supra note 63.
66. Abby Goodnough, Governor of Florida Orders Woman Fed in Right-to-Die Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at Al ("Many lawmakers drew on their own religious beliefs and
experiences with death, sometimes choking up as they described the drawn-out illness of a parent
or spouse."); William March, Schiavo Law Fuels Debate of Politics, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 23, 2003,
Nation/World, at I ("'Nothing more than political grandstanding... a cheap and easy way to
look good to the public,' declared businessman J. Jay Schwartz of Oldsmar, one of more than 500
people who sent e-mail to TBO.com late Tuesday and Wednesday responding to the case.").
67. See Liptak, supra note 63 (discussing reactions to the proposed legislation).
68. Id.
69. Lucy Morgan, Keeping Politiciansout of Your FinalDays, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov.
1, 2003, at lB (stating that a Floridian's right to refuse medical treatment is grounded in
Floridian's constitutional right to privacy); Lois Shepherd, Op-Ed., Gov. Bush: Health Care
Surrogate?,TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Oct. 26, 2003, at 5E.
70. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 336-37 (Fla. 2004). Terri Schiavo's liberty and privacy
interests were also arguably violated by the law, a point made by the lower court but bypassed by
the Florida Supreme Court. Schiavo v. Bush, No. 03-008212-CI-20, 2004 WL 980028, at *3-4
(Fla. Cir. Ct. May 5, 2004). For a discussion of the separation of powers issues implicated by
Terri's Law, see Noah, supra note 62, at 121-23.
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the third removal of Terri's feeding tube was drawing near, the Florida
legislature considered a bill that would ostensibly avoid the separation
of powers infirmities of Terri's Law, but nevertheless would apply to
Terri Schiavo's situation. 7 1 This time it was not legislation specific to
her, but covered all people in a permanent vegetative state and required
more specific evidence of a patient's desire to have nutrition and
hydration removed in these circumstances than required under the
existing law. The Florida House passed one version of a bill; 7 2 the
73
Florida Senate considered another, but rejected it by a few votes.
Terri Schiavo's feeding tube was removed for the third time on March
18, 2005. 74
What amounted to a national death watch played
continually on televised media.
Even more extraordinary than the actions of the Florida legislature
and governor in 2003, in 2005 Terri Schiavo's case became the subject
of involvement by the U.S. Congress. First, on the date of the feeding
tube's removal in 2005, subpoenas were issued for Terri Schiavo, her
husband, and others involved in the case to appear before a
congressional committee. 75 Terri Schiavo was subpoenaed under a
theory that failing to provide her with artificial nutrition and hydration
would constitute an illegal obstruction of the subpoena. 76 Judge Greer,
however, decided that the congressional subpoena would not affect the
order requiring the removal of the feeding tube.77 Then, Congress
passed a law granting federal court jurisdiction over this particular case,
by name, stating that review should be de novo. 78 The federal court
hearing the matter decided that a preliminary injunction ordering
reinsertion of the feeding tube would not be granted, however, because
the parents of Terri Schiavo had not shown a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of their claim that there had been inadequate

71. H.R. 701, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005), S. 804, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005).
72. H.R. 701, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005).
73. S. 0804, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005); Stephen Nolgren, "I'm Here Because I Care,"
Jackson Tells Crowd, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 30, 2005, at 1 A (explaining how the
measure failed 2 1-18).
74. Maya Bell & Etan Horowitz, Schiavo's Feeding is Stopped Despite Last-Ditch
CongressionalAction, BALT. SUN, Mar. 19, 2005, at IA.
75. Adam Liptak, With Schiavo Subpoenas, Lawmakers Leap into Contested Territory, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at A12.
76. William R. Levesque et al., Tube is Removed After Chaotic Day, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2005, at IA.
77. Id.; Phil Long et al., Judge Rejects Congress' Subpoena, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 19, 2005,
at IA.
78. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119
Stat. 15 (2005).
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process in the state courts. 7 9 In making this decision, the federal court
considered the extent of process that had taken place in the state courts
over seven years, rather than ignoring the fact that the case had been
through the state courts, as the drafters of the legislation appeared to
have assumed, or at least hoped, the court would do.
Florida Governor Jeb Bush then made one last-ditch effort to restore
Terri's feeding tube through the powers of the Florida Department of
Children and Families (DCF) and the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement. DCF previously sought intervention in the case, but did
not succeed. 80 In fact, Judge Greer entered an order forbidding DCF
from "taking possession" of Terri, but because that order was
automatically stayed upon the filing of an appeal, DCF apparently
intended to take Terri Schiavo from the hospice with the aid of the
Florida state police. 8 1 When made aware of the effect of the automatic
stay, Judge Greer canceled it, but not before a squad of state police and
DCF officials were en route to the hospice where Terri Schiavo was
cared for, with apparent intent to remove her to a hospital for reinsertion
of the feeding tube. Before they arrived, however, local police told the
state agents they would not allow Terri to be removed without a court
order; state agents then backed down. The Miami Herald quoted one
official's description of the day's events: "There were two sets of law
,,82
enforcement officers facing off, waiting for the other to blink .
State officials later denied any suggestion that a "showdown" had
occurred.8 3
Terri Schiavo died on March 31, 2005, as the public obtained hourly
79. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
80. Petition/Motion for Intervention, Stay of Order of the Probate Court, Appointment of
Legal Counsel for Theresa Marie Schiavo and Sealing of the Proceedings, Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (No. 2908GD-003), available
at http://abstractappeal.com/schiavo/DCFpetition.pdf (filing by representative of Florida
Department of Children and Families on February 23, 2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.
Schiavo,
No.
2908GD-003
(M.D.
Fla.
Mar.
10,
2005),
available
at
http://abstractappeal.com/schiavo/trialctorder03l005.pdf (denying the February petition and
ruling that intervention by DCF was not appropriate).
81. Carol Marbin Miller, Terri Schiavo Case: Plan to Seize Schiavo Fizzles, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 26, 2005, at IA. DCF's second petition for intervention, filed March 23, 2005, is available
at http://abstractappeal.com/schiavo/DCFpetition2.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2005). The petition
was
denied.
The
Terri
Schiavo
Information
Page,
http://abstractappeal.comlschiavo/infopage.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2006) (discussing the
Schiavo case timeline); see also Carl Jones, Appellate Review, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Sept. 26,
2005, at 18 (reporting Florida appellate court's issuance of explanation for its decision to uphold
Judge Greer's Mar. 23, 2005 emergency order to prevent DCF from removing Terri Schiavo from

the hospice).
82.
83.

Miller, supra note 81.
Id.
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updates by radio, the Internet, and television. The last few days of
Terri's life were as bitterly contentious as the previous decade's fight
over the decision to discontinue life support. As reported by the media,
Michael Schiavo and the Schindler family fought over who would
spend time with Terri, over the performance of religious last rites, over
whether she would be cremated or buried and over where her remains
would be placed.8 4

III.

QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE SCHIAVO CONTROVERSY

The Schiavo controversy prompts many questions about end-of-life
decision-making law and its future. This Part offers ways of thinking
about three of them and poses three questions: What is the role of
surrogate decision-making? 85 Under what conditions should the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment be permitted by surrogate
decision-makers? 86 How does the removal8 7 of artificial nutrition and
hydration relate to other forms of treatment?
A. How much deference should be given to surrogatedecision-makers?
How should the interests offamily members, or others close to the
patient,be weighed againstrespecting the preferences or best interests
of the patient?8
Throughout the unfolding story of Terri Schiavo and the fight
between her husband and her parents, the following remark could be
repeatedly heard from many of those who supported the decision to
withdraw Terri Schiavo's feeding tube: "But it's the husband's decision,
right?" Not exactly. Constitutional law, common law, and statutory
law, as they have developed in this area, all agree that there are two
main considerations at work in determining treatment decisions for the
incompetent patient-the patient's self-determination and the patient's
interests. 89 As between the two, primary emphasis is placed upon
respecting the patient's preferences if they can be determined, rather

84. Ellen Gamerman, Schiavo's Family Urges Jeb Bush to Act as Legal Appeals Fail;
Schindlers,Husband Clash over Wide Range of Issues, BALT. SUN, Mar. 27, 2005, at 10A.
85. See infra Part IlI.A (discussing the appropriate level of deference to surrogates).
86. See infra Part III.B (discussing the varying physical conditions and whether surrogates
should be able to withdraw life-sustaining treatment during each condition).
87. See infra Part III.C (considering whether nutrition and hydration should be treated as basic
care or medical treatment).
88. These questions are explored in more depth in Lois Shepherd, Shattering the Neutral
Surrogate Myth in End-of-Life Decisionmaking: Terri Schiavo and Her Family, 35 CUMBERLAND
L. REv. 575, 583-95 (2005).
89. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (giving
the typical formulation of this standard); MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 4.01 [A] & [B].
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than conducting an objective weighing of her interests in accepting or
refusing treatment. 90 Thus, for surrogate decision-making, the legal
standard the courts have adopted is that the surrogate (or "proxy," as it
is called in Florida) expresses for the patient what the patient would
want done. It is the patient's decision, 9 not
the husband's or the
1
parents', or, as it used to be, the physician's.
Because the law seeks to determine and respect what the patient
would want in regards to continuing or discontinuing treatment, the
issue of who actually serves as health care proxy should not
theoretically be of great significance. 92 Yet, the Schiavo controversy
revealed very clearly that it does matter who is named proxy. If either
of the Schindlers had been named proxy prior to the original 2000 court
order, they would have requested the continuation of their daughter's
90. Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493; MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 4.01[A] & [B].
Florida has adopted this same standard in caselaw and by statute:
We emphasize and caution that when the patient has left instructions regarding lifesustaining treatment, the surrogate must make the medical choice that the patient, if
competent, would have made, and not one that the surrogate might make for himself or
herself, or that the surrogate might think is in the patient's best interests.
In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990).
[A] proxy's decision to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence that the decision would have been the one
the patient would have chosen had the patient been competent or, if there is no
indication of what the patient would have chosen, that the decision is in the patient's
best interest.
Fla. Stat. § 765.401(3) (2004).
91. The Florida Supreme Court emphasized this point in Browning: "One does not exercise
another's right of self-determination or fulfill that person's right of privacy by making a decision
which the state, the family, or public opinion would prefer. The surrogate decisionmaker must be
confident that he or she can and is voicing the patient's decision." Browning, 568 So. 2d at 13.
On the issue of past deference to physician decisions in these and other matters relating to
medical treatment, see generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY
OF How LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 1-2 (1991).
Rothman writes:
Well into the post-World War 1I period, decisions at the bedside were the almost
exclusive concern of the individual physician, even when they raised fundamental
ethical and social issues. It was mainly doctors who wrote and read about the morality
of withholding a course of antibiotics and letting pneumonia serve as the old man's
best friend, of considering a newborn with grave birth defects a 'stillbirth' and sparing
the parents the agony of choice and the burden of care ....
Moreover, it was usually
the individual physician who decided these matters at the bedside or in the privacy of
the hospital room, without formal discussions with patients, their families, or even with
colleagues, and certainly without drawing the attention of journalists, judges, or
professional philosophers.
Id.
92. See supra note 40, for the list of individuals who can serve as proxy under Florida law
when the patient has not herself, through an advance directive, named someone to serve as her
surrogate.
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feeding tube, and almost certainly that request would have been granted.
They would not have been required to get court approval for continued
feeding, and they would easily have been able to find a physician and
long-term care facility to concede to their request. 93 Indeed, the request
to continue the feeding tube would have been assumed.9 4 The feeding
tube, then, would have remained in place until Terri Schiavo died of
other causes, which might not have occurred for another twenty or thirty
years. 9 5 As explained below, this result would likely have occurred
even if Terri herself wanted the feeding tube removed, as a court in this
case had found. 96 Remarkably, although our legal standard does not
appear to allow a degree of discretion granting surrogates the authority
to decide whatever they would want for an incompetent patient, it
unfortunately does so.
How is this the case and should we be bothered by it? The
combination of two factors produces such results: first, the lack of
judicial review for treatment decisions generally and, more particularly,
the lack of judicial review of decisions to continue treatment; and
second, the presumption in favor of life-sustaining treatments, including
artificial nutrition and hydration. 9 7 Together, these two factors mean
that a decision to continue treatment is not often subjected to any sort of
review, whereby proxies are put to the task of producing evidence of the
patient's preferences. It is only when a decision is made to discontinue
life-sustaining treatment that the proxy's decision must be based on
clear and convincing evidence regarding patient preferences. 9 8 Thus, to

93. See COLBY, supra note 2, at 361-62 (describing the difficulty the Cruzan family faced in
finding health care providers to concede to their request to have Nancy Beth Cruzan's feeding
tube removed, even when the court approved its removal); see also Orentlicher & Callahan, supra
note 42, at 397 (suggesting generally that feeding tubes can be overused).
94. This is so because the proxy's removal of the feeding tube must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence that removal is appropriate, Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15; Fla. Stat. §
765.401(3) (2004), whereas a proxy's decision to continue feeding would not be subject to the
same scrutiny. See infra text accompanying notes 97-98 (discussing the lack of judicial review
over feeding tube continuation and the presumption in favor of continued feeding).
95. See JENNETr, supra note 1, at 65-69 (describing the life expectancy of people in a
permanent vegetative state).
96. See supra notes 45-46 (describing the evidence cited by the court that showed, to a clear
and convincing standard that Terri would have wanted the feeding tube removed).
97. The presumption in favor of life is manifested in the requirement that it is only when a
decision is made to discontinue life-sustaining treatment that the proxy's decision must be based
on clear and convincing evidence regarding the patient's preferences or her best interests. See
Browning, 543 So. 2d at 273, for a discussion of how this standard of evidence for treatment
refusals for incompetent patients works to "err on the side of life." See also Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d
176, 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (reconfirming that a court's default position must favor life).
98. The clear and convincing standard is an intermediate standard between a preponderance of
the evidence (the typical civil standard of proof) and beyond a reasonable doubt (the typical
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continue treatment the Schindlers would not need clear and convincing
evidence that their daughter would have wished treatment continued
and, in fact, could probably have continued treatment even when others
might have produced strong evidence that she would have wanted it
discontinued.
If Terri Schiavo had executed a living will clearly expressing a desire
not to continue feeding in a permanent vegetative state, that might have
sufficed to overcome the deference to the proxy's decision to continue
treatment, but mere oral evidence would unlikely have been enough. 99
Even a living will can be challenged as insufficiently directive, or as
having been coerced or executed without proper knowledge of the
circumstances, or as being outdated and no longer expressing the wishes
of the patient.
In our hypothetical, where one of Terri Schiavo's parents acted as
proxy without a living will, the proxy's decision to continue perpetual
feeding would almost certainly have prevailed, and there would likely
have been no challenge to that decision or any controversy surrounding
it. If she had been in a condition in which she experienced pain or
suffered in any way from continued feeding, however, then the situation
might have been viewed differently, and health care providers or family
members might have been able to challenge successfully a decision to
continue feeding. But a patient in a permanent vegetative state does not
experience pain or suffering, and courts have not been willing to give
much weight to the burden of indignity that some believe is associated
with living in a state of permanent unconsciousness (which also, of
course, cannot be experienced by such a patient). 10 0 Thus, because
criminal standard of proof). The majority opinion in Cruzan noted that clear and convincing
evidence was that which
produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the
allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and
convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285 (1990) (citing In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394

(1987)).
99. In Florida, a written living will establishes a rebuttable presumption that constitutes clear
and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 16.
100. See, e.g., DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 705 (Ky. 1993) (stating that best interests
analysis would not be adopted), limited by Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2004);
Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 759 (Md. 1993) (refusing to allow best interest analysis to be
applied to patient in a permanent vegetative state without legislative guidelines); In re Peter, 529
A.2d 419, 425 (N.J. 1987) ("[A] benefits-burden analysis.., is essentially impossible with
patients in a persistent vegetative state."); see also 73 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 162, 189-90 (1988)
("The balancing of costs and benefits to the patient that a surrogate must undertake for a
terminally ill patient cannot be done in the same way for a patient who is permanently
unconscious.") (emphasis added).
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Terri Schiavo experienced no burden by continued feeding, it would
have been difficult for anyone to challenge successfully the Schindlers'
treatment decision in court in this hypothetical situation.
This is not to say that the same result would have been obtained if the
Schindlers had been successful in replacing Michael Schiavo as proxy
after the 2000 court order that authorized the removal of the feeding
tube. (Recall that in our hypothetical scenario, one of the Schindlers
becomes proxy before that time.) Because the court in 2000 determined
that Terri would have wished to discontinue tube feeding, the proxy was
at that point bound to follow the court's determination of the patient's
wishes. The Schindlers' reluctance to do so would have made them
inappropriate proxies for their daughter. What the Schiavo case reveals
is how much freedom proxies have to make these decisions when they
are not reviewed by courts. And such cases are less likely to come
before a court when the decision is made in favor of non-burdensome
treatment.
According to Florida statutes, in the early years of Terri Schiavo's
vegetative state, either Michael Schiavo or one of the Schindlers could
have served as her proxy, although Michael Schiavo had statutory
priority as her spouse. 0 1 The fact that family members with such
diverse views of the appropriateness of continued treatment might
qualify to serve as proxies and the fact that the view of only one (the
one with statutory priority) generally prevails, is obviously troubling.
How can we say that our system of family surrogate I° 2 decision making
respects the patient's wishes or interests if such opposing results can
occur; here, the parents favored continued treatment (life) and the
spouse favored its discontinuation (death)?
Though we should find this result troubling, that does not mean that
we should abandon the system of family surrogates or require judicial
review of every significant medical treatment decision for incompetent
patients. Family decision making is valuable for reasons other than the
1 3
family
members'
supposed
competency
the patient.
We
value family
surrogate
decision
makingtoinspeak
part for
because
many 0people

101. See priority listing, supra note 40 (listing the priority of proxies under Florida law).
102. When speaking of the "family surrogate" I mean to use the word "family" in a very broad
sense. The Florida statutes, for example, include "close friend" in the list of those who might
become a patient's proxy. See supra note 40, for a list of the persons who may serve as proxy in
Florida.
103. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & MED. &
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: ETHICAL,

MED., AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 126-28 (1983). For a fuller discussion of
this point, see Shepherd, supra note 88.
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want family members to speak for them, or even to do more--to make
decisions for them when they lose competency. 10 4 Family members
their
also have a great amount at stake in these decisions involving
10 5
loved ones--much of which we should respect and value.
The deference accorded to family surrogates to continue treatment
may be justified in the case of the terminally ill patient. In such cases, if
the treatment is not burdensome in a way that is experienced by the
patient, then the law may be striking the right balance by deferring to
family members who are making choices in favor of life that they
believe are appropriate, even if it means at times that the patient's
preferences to die sooner or avoid certain treatments are not always
To always, or even routinely, insist upon a judicial
honored.
discernment of the preferences of the patient would cause an intrusive
disruption by the state into matters generally considered private. Often
the patient's preferences will not be clear in any event, sometimes even
when a written directive exists. 106 Even assuming that judicial
involvement means that patient preferences are honored more often, the
extra burdens imposed upon the family by state involvement may well
not be justified by the satisfaction of patient preferences to avoid only a
few days or weeks of unwanted life.
This sort of accommodation of a family surrogate's decision to
continue treatment, however, is more problematic when the patient is
not terminally ill but is instead in a permanent vegetative state. For the
person in a permanent vegetative state, the ease with which a surrogate
can continue tube feeding even if that is not what the patient would
want more clearly fails to respect that person's autonomy. Instead of a
few unwanted days of life in a diminished condition, the result could be
a few unwanted decades of life, as we can imagine would have
happened in the Schiavo case if the Schindlers had been named proxy.
What this suggests is that the law should provide different rules for
effectuating patient choice to refuse treatment when the patient has
entered a permanent vegetative state. The law should provide judicial
or quasi-judicial review of decisions to feed patients indefinitely in a

104. Id. Most Americans believe that family members should make end-of-life treatment
decisions for their close relatives. See Stephen C. Hines, Ph.D. et al., Dialysis Patients'
Preferencesfor Family-Based Advance Care Planning, 130 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 825,
825-28 (1999); see also In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 446, n.ll (N.J. 1987) (reporting on surveys);
D.M. High, All in the Family: Extended Autonomy and Expectations in Surrogate Health Care
Decision-Making, THE GERONTOLOGIST, 28, 46-51 (Supp. 1988).
105. Shepherd, supra note 88, at 585.
106. See generally Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living
Will, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP., 30, 30-42 (2004) (describing the inadequacies of living wills).
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permanent vegetative state because of the profound effect that such
decisions have. 10 7
The law should also consider removing the
presumption in favor of life in such instances 10 8 because an error by the
surrogate in reflecting patient preferences can, as Justice Brennan stated
years ago in Cruzan, "rob a patient of the very qualities protected by the
right to avoid unwanted medical treatment."109 Just as a decision to
withdraw life support is irrevocable because death results, as Justice
Brennan wrote, so too is a decision to continue it, at least from the point
of view of the patient. The patient's "own degraded existence is
perpetuated; his family's suffering is protracted; the memory he leaves
behind becomes more and more distorted."'1 10
Incredibly, a bill was introduced in the Ohio House in the spring
of 2005 that would have made it even more likely that the preferences
for treatment withdrawal of a person in a permanent vegetative state
would be ignored."
Like Florida, Ohio's law has for a number of
years provided a list of those who might serve as surrogates and
prioritized those according to the relationship with the patient-for
example, placing spouse before parent. 112 The proposed law would
have disregarded that priority in the case of surrogate designations for
patients in a permanent vegetative state who had not executed an
advance directive. 113 Regardless of the hierarchy set out in the statute,
any person among those listed in the hierarchy who would agree in
writing not to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from a person
in a permanent vegetative state would leapfrog over the others and be
given the powers of the surrogate. 114 Under this Ohio bill, what the
patient herself might have wanted would not only have been
subordinated to the interests of family members, it would have been
rendered irrelevant. 115 The bill's effect would have been to nullify a
107. See Lois Shepherd, In Respect of People Living in a Permanent Vegetative State-And
Allowing Them to Die, 16 HEALTH MATRIX (forthcoming 2006).
108. Id.
109. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 320 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. H.R. 201, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005). As of January 7, 2006, the Bill
remained in committee.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. The person who sought to establish surrogate status in this manner would also have to
agree to bear the financial burden of the continued treatment and care of the patient. Id. The
Ohio Senate also considered something less outrageous. See S. 130, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 2005) (allowing a surrogate's decision to withdraw nutrition and hydration to be
challenged by family members lower in the statutory hierarchy if the latter present some evidence
that the decision is not consistent with the previously expressed intention of the patient).
115. H.R. 201, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
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patient's wishes to discontinue tube feeding by deferring to a surrogate
who determined otherwise.
Throughout the Schiavo litigation, especially as the Governor of
Florida became involved in defending his actions to reinsert Terri's
feeding tube in 2003, concerned parties argued that the surrogate
decision-making procedures established by Florida law did not
adequately protect Terri's interests. In particular, the Governor and
those who supported his actions charged that the decision to remove
Terri's feeding tube had not been accompanied by process sufficiently
protective of Terri's interest in life.' 1 6 Therefore, the Florida legislature
considered a number of proposals in 2004 and early 2005 that would
have made it more difficult to withdraw artificial nutrition and
hydration from incompetent individuals. For example, one proposal
required that the patient have a living will 1 17 or, in the absence of a
living will, that the patient have made very specific statements
regarding the refusal of nutrition and hydration. 1 18 The arguments by
the Governor and the considerations of the legislature for more
procedural protections in favor of life did not come to fruition, but if
they had, they would have come at a cost to patient autonomy.
The statutory procedures currently in place for withholding or
withdrawing life support have been carefully crafted to balance many
interests and concerns. The right to refuse treatment was recognized in
the United States only after hard-fought, bitter, tragic battles by families
to release their loved ones from what they saw as imprisonment by
forced medical treatment. 119 Any changes to the statutory procedures
established to effectuate that right should be subjected to thorough
review and debate by appropriately convened bodies, such as a task
force, composed of members with knowledge not simply of the recent
Schiavo case, but of the history of this field of law in order to place in
greater context the interests implicated. Changes to procedure designed
to further safeguard a patient's interest in life (such as those advocated
by Florida's Governor Bush and considered by Florida's legislature)
must be approached with exceptional caution. Any additional element
116. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bush v. Schiavo, 125 S. Ct. 1086 (2004) (contending
that the preclusive effects afforded prior litigation violated Florida Governor Jeb Bush's 14th
Amendment due process rights as parens patriae).
117. A "living will" generally denotes a written document that provides instructions regarding
the continuation of life-sustaining treatment in certain conditions, such as a terminal illness or
permanent vegetative state.
118. See, e.g., H.R. 701, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (proposing a presumption that
health care providers provide incompetent persons nutrition and hydration to sustain life).
119. See COLBY, supra note 2, for a moving account of the ordeal experienced by the Cruzan
family in attempting to get approval for the withdrawal of Nancy Cruzan's feeding tube.
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of procedure that is designed to protect a patient's interest in life is

likely to diminish protection of the patient's preferences and the
patient's interests other than the perpetuation of life-for example, the
patient's interest in avoiding suffering. Such procedural "safeguards"
or "burdens," viewed either way, would also have effects on the family,
caregivers, and health care providers that should be considered.
B. In what condition must the patient be to warrantthe withdrawalof
life-sustainingtreatment? How certain do we have to be that the
patient is in that condition? Should we treatdifferent conditions
differently when making the decision to withdraw treatment?

In 1998, when Michael Schiavo first began court proceedings to
determine if his wife's feeding tube could be removed, the Schindlers
did not contest the determination that their daughter was in a permanent
vegetative state. 120
Beginning in 2001, however, they began to
challenge that diagnosis. Ultimately, the Schindlers insisted that she
was in a minimally conscious state 12 1 and that her condition could be
improved with appropriate therapy. The critical difference between a
minimally conscious state and a permanent vegetative state is that the
former condition involves some level of cognitive function,
while there
122
is no evidence of cognition associated with the latter.
There are a number of reasons why it became important for the
Schindlers to challenge the diagnosis of permanent vegetative state.

120. Cerminara, supra note 38. Cerminara points out that the Schindlers did not argue that
Terri was not in a permanent vegetative state until 2001. Before that time, their argument against
removal of the feeding tube was that Michael Schiavo was not accurately representing their
daughter's wishes. See also WOLFSON REPORT, supra note 14, at 33 n.1 (noting that "until
recently" the Schindlers agreed Terri was in a persistent vegetative state).
121. The criteria for diagnosing the minimally conscious state, as recently developed by a
group of experts, are as follows:
Evidence of limited but clearly discernible self or environmental awareness on a
reproducible or sustained basis, by one or more of these behaviours:
1. Simple command following
2. Gestural or verbal 'yes/no' responses (regardless of accuracy)
3. Intelligible verbalization
4. Purposeful behaviour including movements or affective behaviours in
contingent relation to relevant stimuli; examples include:
(a) appropriate smiling or crying to relevant visual or linguistic stimuli
(b) response to linguistic content of questions by vocalization or gesture
(c) reaching for objects in appropriate direction and location
(d) touching or holding objects by accommodating to size and shape
(e) sustained visual fixation or tracking as response to moving stimuli.
JENNETr, supra note 1, at 24.
122. See supra note I (describing the permanent vegetative state).
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First, if Terri Schiavo had some consciousness, even of a minimal sort,
then she would have had some interest in living because she could have
experienced that life, at least in some way. 123 Moreover, if the
Schindlers could have argued credibly that their daughter's condition
had improved over time, this would have suggested that she could
continue to improve in the future with proper therapy. Either some
existing consciousness or some potential for future consciousness would
have called into question the court's earlier determination that Terri
Schiavo would not want to continue living in a permanent vegetative
state. That earlier determination would have needed reexamination and
perhaps reversal.
Second, the Schindlers' claim that their daughter was not, or was no
longer, in a permanent vegetative state was important in garnering
public support for their cause to continue her life support. The
videotapes repeatedly shown on television and the Internet did indeed,
in their shortened form of thirty seconds or so, appear to show a person
responding to her mother's presence. 12 4 Terri Schiavo appeared in
those video segments to be severely disabled, but not completely
unconscious. The characterization of Terri as a person with a severe
disability evoked social impulses to protect her from prejudice, from
discrimination, from ostracism, from abuse, from the sort 1of
"euthanasia" practiced by repressive regimes such as Nazi Germany. 25
A substantial portion of prominent
disability rights groups took up her
12 6
cause under these themes.
123. A number of commentators have noted that individuals in a permanent vegetative state or
otherwise permanently unconscious lack any current or future interests in living because of their
lack of sentience. This lack of interests is unique; those who have some ability to experience life,
however minimal, cannot be said to completely lack any interest in life. ALLEN E. BUCHANAN &
DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 12629 (1989); Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and
Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 378 (1986).
124. The video is still available on a number of websites.
See, e.g.,
http://www.cnsnews.comCulture/Archive/200310/CUL20031014c.html
(last visited Jan. 13,
2006).
125. See Cathy Young, The Rhetoric in Schiavo Case, BOSTON.COM NEWS, Mar. 26, 2005,
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorialopinion/oped/articies/2005/03/26/the rhetoric-in-s
chiavo.case; See also Scarborough Country (MSNBC television broadcast Dec. 2, 2004)
(transcript available at 2005 WLNR 4815744) (with guest appearance by Terry Randall,
described as "Schindler family spokesperson and founder of Operation Rescue," associating the
removal of Terri Schiavo's feeding tube with the deaths of innocent people killed by Nazis).
126. See Stephen Nohlgren & Tom Zucco, Schiavo Case Has Myriad Fund Sources, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at I A. Examples of those who supported the Schindlers are
the Alliance Defense Fund, Life Legal Defense Foundation, RightMarch, the Family Research
Council. Id. Twenty-one national disability rights organizations signed a letter in October of
2003 in support of the continued feeding of Terri Schiavo; the letter compared Terri's situation
with that of persons with Down's syndrome, autism, and ALS. Terri Schindler-Schiavo and
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Most important as a legal matter, however, if Terri Schiavo was in a
minimally conscious state rather than a permanent vegetative state, she
would not have fallen into one of the three conditions that the Florida
statute provides are conditions in which a proxy can withdraw lifesustaining treatment.
Those three conditions are: a terminal
12 8
condition,127 an end-stage condition (such as advanced Alzheimer's),
or a persistent vegetative129 state. Two physicians must verify the

existence of the condition.

State statutes regarding end-of-life decision making are of a curious
nature. Essentially they provide procedures, which if followed, confer
immunity from liability for those involved in treatment withdrawal as
long as they act in good faith. 130 They also provide procedures and
Disability
Rights,
Oct.
27,
2003,
TheArcLink.org,
http://www.thearclink.org/news/article.asp?ID=623.
The letter stated that the "life-and-death
issues surrounding Terri Schindler-Schiavo are first and foremost disability rights issues" and
"Terri Schindler-Schiavo's fate is entwined with all disabled people who rely on surrogates." Id.
127. A "terminal condition" means "a condition caused by injury, disease, or illness from
which there is no reasonable medical probability of recovery and which, without treatment, can
be expected to cause death." FLA. STAT. § 765.101(17) (2004).
128. An "end-stage condition" is "an irreversible condition that is caused by injury, disease, or
illness which has resulted in progressively severe and permanent deterioration, and which, to a
reasonable degree of medical probability, treatment of the condition would be ineffective." FLA.
STAT. § 765.101(4) (2004). This term is commonly understood to embrace advanced dementia,
such as that caused by Alzheimer's, which is "'steadily progressive,' incurable, and ultimately
fatal." See 85 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 33 (2000) (quoting LAWRENCE J. TIERNEY, JR. ET AL.,
CURRENT MEDICAL TREATMENT & DIAGNOSIS 55 (39th ed. 2000)) (interpreting a statute similar
to Florida's).
129. FLA. STAT. § 765.306 (2004).
130. It is difficult, however, to make generalizations about such statutes. As the Prefatory
Note to the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 states:
[A] majority of states have statutes allowing family members, and in some cases close
friends, to make health-care decisions for adult individuals who lack capacity. This
state legislation, however, has developed in fits and starts, resulting in an often
fragmented, incomplete, and sometimes inconsistent set of rules. Statutes enacted
within a state often conflict and conflicts between statutes of different states are
common.
UNIF. HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT, 9 U.L.A. 84-85, prefatory note (2005). According to
Meisel and Cerninara:
The primary purpose of these statutes is to make clear what is at least implicit in the
case law: that the customary medical professional practice of using family members to
make decisions for patients who lack decisionmaking capacity and who lack advance
directives is legally valid, and that ordinarily judicial proceedings need not be initiated
for the appointment of a guardian.
MEISEL& CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 8.01. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.109 (2004) (conferring
immunity on those who in good faith carry out decisions made under the statute); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-322(d) (2003) (conferring immunity in connection with the withholding or
discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment in accordance with the statute); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2133.11 (2005) (conferring immunity on physicians who withhold treatment in
accordance with the statute).
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standards for courts to follow in approving decisions to withdraw
treatment which come before them and which allow family members
who are not proxies to challenge the decisions of those who are
proxies. 131
Generally, such statutes do not explicitly limit treatment-withdrawal
decisions to the situations described in the statute. For example,
Florida's statute does not state that artificial nutrition and hydration
13 2
cannot be withdrawn from someone in a minimally conscious state.
Instead, it states when treatment can be withdrawn. 133 It also explicitly
13 4
preserves the common law and constitutional rights of patients,
although, of course, a statutory recognition of the preservation of
constitutional rights is not necessary.
In Terri Schiavo's situation, it is not clear what effect a diagnosis of
minimal consciousness as opposed to permanent vegetativeness would
have had on the resolution of the case. The circuit court determined,
prior to its 2000 order authorizing the discontinuance of the feeding
tube, that Terri Schiavo was in a permanent vegetative state. 135 A
second hearing was later required by the appellate court when the
Schindlers claimed that there was new evidence regarding medical
treatments that could improve their daughter's condition. 13 6 Although
the Schindlers offered two physicians' testimony that Terri Schiavo's
condition might be something other than a permanent vegetative state at
this second hearing, the circuit court found the testimony of the other
three physicians more persuasive. 13 7 Nevertheless, it is not even clear
from the circuit court's opinion whether a different diagnosis would

131. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.105 (2004) (allowing family members and other interested
parties to seek expedited judicial intervention to review a proxy's decision); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2133.08(E)(1) (2005) (allowing objection by certain family members of proxy's decision
and subsequent judicial review).
132. Health Care Advance Directives, FLA. STAT. §§ 765.101-546 (2004).
133. FLA. STAT. § 765.404 (2004). This statute provides that for patients in a persistent
vegetative state, life-prolonging procedures may be withheld or withdrawn when:
(1) The person has a judicially appointed guardian representing his or her best interest
with authority to consent to medical treatment; and (2) The guardian and the person's
attending physician, in consultation with the medical ethics committee of the facility
where the patient is located, conclude that the condition is permanent ... and that
withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging procedures is in the best interest of the
patient.
Id.
134. FLA. STAT. § 765.106 (2004).
135. Schiavo Original 2000 Order, supra note 4, at 6.
136. Schiavo 111, 800 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
137. In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GB-003, 2002 WL 31817960, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 22,
2002).
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have caused the court to change its mind about the propriety of
removing the feeding tube. 13 8 The court wrote that the real issue was
not whether Terri Schiavo was in a permanent vegetative state (although
it found the evidence overwhelmingly supportive of that view), but
whether treatment options would "significantly improve her quality of
life."' 139 Finding that there was no evidence to that effect, much less a
preponderance of the evidence, the court reaffirmed
its original decision
140
that the feeding tube should be withdrawn.
If the court had found the evidence of the physicians chosen by the
Schindlers to be convincing--in other words, found that Terri Schiavo
was in something other than a true permanent vegetative state-and still
determined that she would not want to continue being tube fed in that
condition, then it would not have been following the procedures and
standards set forth in the Florida statute. But it would still have been
acting within its authority in making that decision, and, in fact, Terri
Schiavo's constitutional rights might have required that determination.
The Florida Supreme Court in In re Browning clearly stated that the
condition of the patient is not a factor that limits the patient's right to
refuse medical treatment. 14 1 In that case, the court approved a
surrogate's decision to withdraw a feeding tube from a woman whose
death was not "imminent" and who was not in a permanent vegetative
state, the two conditions at that time included in the Florida 14statutes
for
2
which a surrogate could withdraw life-prolonging treatment.
It is not clear what the future holds with respect to the legal treatment
of people in a minimally conscious state. Those who argued that Terri
Schiavo was in a minimally conscious state sought to characterize her
condition as one of severe disability, with the implicit assumption that
such individuals should be treated differently from those in a permanent
vegetative state. As a general matter, state statutes do not currently
sanction decisions to withdraw treatment from such individuals, and this
may suggest that treatment withdrawal in such instances is not proper
unless the treatment is burdensome to the patient. Yet under state
constitutions and the Federal Constitution, the question is open. Could
states prohibit treatment withdrawal in such instances? In re Browning
indicates that Florida's constitution, at least, would not allow such a
statutory prohibition. 143 Even the U.S. Constitution might protect the
138. Id. at *4-5.
139. Id. at *3 (referring to the standard set by the District Court of Appeals in Schiavo III).
140. Id. at *5.
141. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990).
142. Id. at 9.
143. See id. at 10 (holding that a patient has a right to refuse treatment irrespective of his or
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right of individuals to have the option of treatment withdrawal in such
instances if they indicated, when competent, their preferences for
treatment withdrawal in such circumstances. 14 4 Nevertheless, state
legislatures or courts may be able to impose higher procedural standards
for withdrawing treatment in such instances. 14 5 The state's interest in
protecting vulnerable individuals from harm and in protecting the
individual's own continued interest in living a life that she can in some
way experience (as opposed to the patient in a permanent vegetative
state) may be sufficiently weighty to justify, as a constitutional matter,
higher procedural safeguards, in accordance with the Supreme Court's
holding in Cruzan.14 6 Respect for the individual's bodily integrity and
autonomy rights, however, should preclude an outright prohibition
against treatment withdrawal for the minimally conscious who at one
time possessed competency.
The fact that higher procedural
requirements might be constitutionally permissible does not, of course,
answer the question whether such requirements would make good
policy.
One final point about the minimally conscious state should be noted.
Many states provide a form living will for residents of the state to
follow, if they wish, to document their choices about the provision of
life-sustaining treatment in the event of later incompetence. 147 In
Florida, that form offers individuals the option of treatment refusal in
the same three conditions that must be present for a proxy to withdraw
treatment under the statute. 148 It does not, therefore, list "minimally
conscious state" as one of the conditions in which a prior preference
regarding treatment might be documented. But if individuals have a
her medical condition).
144. See generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Cruzan
assumed that competent individuals have a right to reject unwanted medical treatment that is not
lost in the event of later incompetence. See supra note 3 (inferring a constitutional right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment).
145. Kathy Cerminara has suggested that stronger evidence of a patient's preferences to refuse
treatment might be warranted for those in a minimally conscious state. Cerminara, supra note 38
(manuscript on file with author).
146. In this regard, note the California case, In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001), finding
that conservator failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the conservatee-who was
severely brain damaged but not permanently vegetative-wished to refuse life-sustaining
treatment or that to withhold such treatment would have been in his best interest. In that case, the
court stated, "It is... worth mentioning that no decision of which we are aware has approved a
conservator's or guardian's proposal to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from a
conscious conservatee or ward." Id. at 170.
147. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.05[B].
148. FLA. STAT. § 765.303 (2004). A person may elect to withold treatment if: (1) he or she
has a terminal condition; (2) has an end-state condition; or (3) is in a persistent vegetative state.
Id.
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common law and/or constitutional right to have treatment withdrawn in
conditions that are not listed in the statutory form (like the minimally
conscious state), then the form is misleading and unnecessarily limited.
It is entirely possible that a number of people who wish to execute a
living will would not want to be kept alive for fifteen years in a
minimally conscious state. Yet if a person's living will specifies certain
conditions in which treatment should be withdrawn and does not specify
others, the living will might actually be used as evidence that the person
did not want treatment withdrawn in a minimally conscious state, when
actually the form provided by the state simply addressed certain
conditions and not others. 14 9 Statutory forms that limit treatment
withdrawal to certain narrow physical conditions are poor tools for
effectuating individual choice in end-of-life decision-making.
If
lawmakers are going to champion the living will as the sort of proof that
will suffice to avoid a controversy like that over Terri Schiavo-and
they have--then people need to be given an easy and inexpensive way
to protect themselves against forced treatment in the conditions in
which they would like to reject it. 150 Similarly, hospital policies on the
withdrawal of life support also merit review following our collective
consciousness-raising about the minimally conscious state. Do they,
like the living will forms, mirror the limited statutory standards for the
refusal of life support? If so, they also merit reconsideration.
C. Should there be stricterrules for withdrawingfeeding than other
forms of treatment?
The fact that the treatment withdrawn from Terri Schiavo was
artificial nutrition and hydration rather than a ventilator or other form of
medical treatment held great significance for many people. Even

149. A similar problem arose in the case of Wright v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys, Corp., 728
A.2d 166 (Md. 1999). There, a man living with AIDS had executed a living will in accordance
with the end-of-life decision-making statute in effect at the time. Id. at 175. The living will
therefore specified that it would take effect when two physicians had determined that his death
was imminent (then the only condition covered by the statute). Id. The court reasoned that the
living will could not take effect in the event of any other condition. Id. Although the living will
statute had since been modified to include other conditions (terminal condition, persistent
vegetative state, end-stage condition), the living will was governed, and therefore limited, by its
own terms. Id.
150. An example may be forms that describe the kinds of human interactions or sensations a
patient may find critically important for enjoyment or meaning of life and the permanent absence
of which the patient would find intolerable. There may, however, simply not be a way to
document many of these choices effectively, both because of the difficulty of predicting in
advance what one would want and the limits of drafting in advance for the complex situations that
actually come to pass. See Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 106, at 30-42 (describing the
inadequacies of living wills).
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though Terni Schiavo would not experience the lack of nutrition and
hydration upon removal of her feeding tube, protestors charged that she
was being "starved" to death.15 1
Even supposedly objective
newscasters adopted this highly charged language of starvation,
carrying with it the clear implication that Terri Schiavo was being
deprived of care, that she was being neglected and abused. 152 In many
ways, those who protested the removal of her feeding tube did so
primarily not because they believed that Michael Schiavo was
misrepresenting his wife's wishes or that Terri Schiavo was minimally
conscious, but because they believed that feeding should never be
withdrawn from a patient unless it is burdensome. To fail to feed is to
fail to care, on this view, and is an unacceptable way for human beings
to treat one another.
The Florida legislature responded to these concerns in the spring of
2004 and 2005. In those legislative sessions, the Florida State House of
Representatives and Senate considered various versions of a bill that
would add procedural hurdles for the withdrawal of artificial nutrition
and hydration by a proxy for an incompetent patient. Under the
proposed legislation, a proxy could only withdraw artificial nutrition
and hydration if the patient had a living will directing that it be
withdrawn in the situation that eventuated or had made very specific
oral directives that would satisfy the legal notion of informed
consent. 153 The title of the original bill reveals its bias: the Starvation
151. Mom Makes Plea to Save Daughter; Congress Move Could Reinstate Feeding Tube for
Terri Schiavo, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 20, 2005, at A02 (describing protestors symbolically
attempting to bring food and water to Terri Schiavo outside her hospice); Terri Schiavo, 41, Dies
(CNN television broadcast Mar. 31, 2005) (transcript available at 2005 WLNR 5042450)
(featuring video clip of Rep. Tom DeLay stating, "A young woman in Florida is being dehydrated
and starved to death.").
152. FOX on the Record with Greta Van Susteren: Terri Schiavo Case Inciting Passionate
and Desperate Measures (FOX News television broadcast Mar. 26, 2005) (transcript available at
2005 WLNR 4766040).
In fact, the Schindlers in a court filing urging that a guardian ad litem be allowed to oversee
swallowing tests and therapy for Terri Schiavo, invoking a Florida statute providing that it is a
felony to withhold food from a disabled or vulnerable adult. Petitioners' Response to Court's
Request Regarding Guardian ad Litem, In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 5,
2004). See FLA. STAT. § 825.102(3)(a)(1) (2004), which in certain circumstances makes neglect
of an elderly or disabled adult a felony and defines neglect to include:
A caregiver's failure or omission to provide an elderly person or disabled adult with
the care, supervision, and services necessary to maintain the elderly person's or
disabled adult's physical and mental health, including, but not limited to, food,
nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine, and medical services that a prudent
person would consider essential for the well-being of the elderly person or disabled
adult.
Id.
153. The bill proposed in Spring 2004, for example, required that for artificial nutrition and
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' 154
and Dehydration of Persons with Disabilities Prevention Act."
Interest in this topic remains high in Florida (although neither
legislative session passed the proposed bill) and in other states, some of
which have considered similar legislation in the wake of the Schiavo
controversy. 155 The fact that Pope John Paul II, in spring 2004, also
hydration to be withdrawn in the absence of a written directive by the patient, there had to be
clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent person, when competent, gave "express and
informed consent" to withdrawing or withholding nutrition or hydration in the applicable
circumstances. The incompetent person must have expressed a desire to have treatment
withdrawn in the same kind of circumstances in which the person later finds herself. Moreover,
the "express and informed consent" that is required means that the person, when expressing a
desire to have nutrition and hydration withdrawn, had general knowledge of the procedure
contemplated, the available alternatives to the procedure, and knowledge of the medical condition
under which the treatment would be withdrawn. S.B. 692, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004).
154. Id.
155. The following states have proposed similar bills: Alabama Starvation and Dehydration of
Persons With Disabilities Prevention Act, H.B. 592, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2005); Hawaii
Starvation and Dehydration of Persons With Disabilities Prevention Act, H.B. 1577, 23d State
Leg. (Haw. 2005); Iowa Starvation and Dehydration of Persons With Disabilities Prevention Act,
H. Study B. 302, 81st Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2005); H.B. 501, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005);
Human Dignity Act, S.B. 40, 31st Reg. Sess. (La. 2005); Presumption of Nutrition and Hydration
Sufficient to Sustain Life, S. File 2184, 84th Leg. Sess., 1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005); Presumption
of Nutrition and Hydration Sufficient to Sustain Life Act, H.B. 905, 93d Gen. Assem., Ist Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2005); S.B. 4083, 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); North Carolina Disabled
Persons Protection Act, H.B. 1175, Gen. Assem., Sess. 2005 (N.C. 2005); S.B. 130, 126th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
Several of these bills (Alabama's, Hawaii's, Iowa's,
Minnesota's, and North Carolina's) are modeled on an act proposed by the National Right to Life
Committee, called the "Model Starvation and Dehydration of Persons with Disabilities Prevention
Act." Press Release, National Right to Life Committee Spurred by Schindler-Schiavo Case,
Model State Law to Prevent Starvation and Dehydration Proposed, available at
http://www.nrlc.org/euthanasia/ModelBillAnnoucement.html
(last visited Jan. 13, 2006)
[hereinafter NRLC Press Release]. The model law proposed by the National Right to Life
Committee creates a presumption that those incapable of making health care decisions would
wish to receive food and fluids so long as their provision is medically possible, would not itself
hasten death, and can be ingested or absorbed so as to sustain life. NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM.,
MODEL STARVATION AND DEHYDRATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITITES PREVENTION ACT
(Revised 2006), http://www.nrlc.org/euthanasia/modeln&hstatelaw.pdf
[hereinafter NRLC
MODEL STATE LAW]. The presumption would not apply in cases where the person has
specifically authorized the withholding or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in an appropriate
legal document, such as an advanced directive, or where there is clear and convincing evidence
that the person gave express and informed consent to the rejection of food and fluids. Id. The
definition of "express and informed consent" requires that the patient have understanding of the
procedure to provide artificial nutrition and hydration, the risks and hazards of the procedure, and
alternatives." Id. This definition is so restrictive that the NRLC's proposal would virtually
require a writing in every instance. Indeed, the sponsors of the model act probably intend that
result-to require a writing. The proposal allows for the possibility that oral evidence can meet
the clear and convincing evidence because of concerns that it otherwise would not pass
constitutional scrutiny. NRLC Press Release, supra. To meet the standard in the model law, the
oral evidence would have to show that a patient like Terri Schiavo understood what a persistent
vegetative state was and how artificial nutrition and hydration was medically provided. NRLC
MODEL STATE LAW, supra. This is a level of understanding that we would certainly expect from
a surrogate before making a present decision to continue or refuse artificial nutrition and
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spoke on the importance of continuing artificial feeding of people in a
permanent vegetative state adds to the likelihood that this will continue
to be an issue. 156 The Pope announced that nutrition and hydration
must be considered "basic care" that cannot be removed unless the
benefits of such removal outweigh the burdens, an announcement that
prompted Catholic health care systems to begin reviewing their policies
15 7
in regard to the feeding of patients in a permanent vegetative state.
I would like to suggest two primary ways of addressing the question
whether it should be more difficult to withdraw artificial feeding from
incompetent patients than other treatments. The first approach is to
consider whether stricter rules for withdrawing artificial feeding can be
justified under our current understanding of the right to refuse treatment
protected by the U.S. Constitution and many state constitutions.
According to the clear consensus of courts, competent individuals have
a right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration and do not lose that
right when they become incompetent. 158 Clearly, the legislation
proposed in Florida and other states, and the model act proposed by the
National Right to Life Committee upon which many of these state
efforts are based, 159 attempt to work within the parameters set out in
those cases. The proposed legislation does not treat the provision of
artificial nutrition and hydration differently from other medical
treatments when competent patients are involved, but does treat it
differently for incompetent patients. 16 The legislation also does not
restrict legal recognition of living wills that clearly reject artificial
nutrition and hydration. Instead, the proposed legislation appears (at
least) designed to insure that artificial feeding is not withdrawn against
the patient's wishes in those cases in which there is an incompetent
hydration for such a patient, but it is not the sort of understanding that courts have generally
insisted upon patients having prior to incompetency in order for their preferences about treatment
withdrawal in a permanent vegetative state to be honored.
156. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Catholic Stance on Tube-Feeding is Evolving, WASH. POST, Mar.

27, 2005, at A7.
157. At the time, the practice of Catholic hospitals in the United States had been to allow
family members more discretion to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration for patients in a
permanent vegetative state. Leonard J. Nelson, 11, Catholic Bioethics and the Case of Terri
Schiavo, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 543, 544-45 (2005). This was permitted under the more general
policy that artificial nutrition and hydration can be withdrawn from incompetent patients when
continued treatment is burdensome to the patient or the patient's family. Id. at 556-57.
158. See, e.g., In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 11-12 (Fla. 1990) (citing cases regarding the
right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration); see also Rasmussen ex rel. Mitchell v. Fleming,
741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987) (explaining that the fight of privacy and the doctrine of informed
consent gave the patient the right to refuse medical treatment).
159. NRLC MODEL STATE LAW, supra note 155.
160. See id. (addressing only decisions to withhold or withdraw nutrition and hydration from a
person "legally incapable of making health care decisions").
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patient and no clear written directive. 16 1 As will become clear shortly,
however, I think we cannot justify stricter requirements for artificial
feeding relative to requirements for other forms of medical treatment in
the name of promoting the accuracy of surrogate reflections of patient
preferences.
The second approach in considering this question is to ask whether
the courts have been correct in finding that artificial nutrition and
hydration is similar to other medical treatments that can be withdrawn
upon competent evidence of the patient's preferences. It is important to
consider this approach because, again, much of the protest over the
removal of Terri Schiavo's feeding tube was about feeding itself, rather
than a concern that her wishes were misrepresented. Courts do not now
appear inclined to change course on this issue, but the potential for more
vitalist 16 2 or conservative judges in the future makes this a question that
cannot be ignored. Though in some ways reviewing this issue covers
old ground that was debated thoroughly in the 1980s and 1990s, 16 3 1
want to suggest that a little-noticed aspect of the Schiavo
controversy-the suggestion that Terri Schiavo might be fed by
hand-may present some new ways of looking at the issue.
1. Can stricter procedural requirements for the removal of artificial
feeding be justified within the context of a constitutional
right to refuse
164
artificial feeding?
Recent efforts to restrict the ability of surrogates to withdraw
nutrition and hydration from patients reflect a break in the consensus
that has developed over the past twenty-five years in medical and legal
communities.
That consensus had held that artificially provided

161. See id. (under proposed model law, presumption in favor of feeding is inapplicable when
a person has executed a directive in accordance with state advance directive statutes).
162. See Stacey A. Tovino & William J. Winslade, A Primer on the Law and Ethics of
Treatment, Research, and Public Policy in the Context of Severe Traumatic Brain Injury, 14
ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 27 (2004) (defining "vitalism" as "the value system that holds that any
human life is precious and should be biologically prolonged as long as possible and at any cost");
see also Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 442-43 (1988)
("A vitalist believes that life, in and of itself, is a good worth preserving."); see generally Alicia
R. Ouellette, When Vitalism is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination Against and Torture of
Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment, 79 IND. L.J. 1 (2004) (arguing
against a vitalist approach).
163. See generally BY No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO LIFESUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER (Joanne Lynn, M.D. ed. 1990) (compiling several academic
articles dealing with all aspects of the debate).
164. Portions of this section of the article appear in similar form in Lois Shepherd, Changing
the Rules on Withdrawing Nutrition and Hydration: From "Terri's Law" to the "Starvation and
Dehydration" Bill, II FLA. B. PUB. INT. L. SEC. REP. 1 (April 2004).
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nutrition and hydration should be treated in the same manner as other
forms of medical treatment. 165 As the Florida Supreme Court wrote in
In re Browning:
We conclude that a competent person has the constitutional right to
choose or refuse medical treatment, and that right extends to all
relevant decisions concerning one's health. Courts overwhelmingly
have held that a person may refuse or remove artificial life-support,
whether supplying oxygen by a mechanical respirator or supplying
food and water through a feeding tube. We agree and find no
significant6 6 legal distinction between these artificial means of lifesupport. 1

Reflecting this consensus, many state statutes expressly place
artificially provided nutrition and hydration on par with other forms of
medical treatment, like ventilators and dialysis, which may in
appropriate circumstances be
withdrawn from patients, including those
67
who have lost competency. 1
As Cruzan, Browning, and numerous court decisions from other
states have determined, the right to refuse treatment is not lost by virtue
of incapacity or incompetence. 168
Rather, the question is what
procedures must be followed to determine that the decision made
regarding continued treatment is the one the incompetent individual
would choose for herself if she could. A state may impose procedural
requirements to safeguard this169"personal element" of an individual's
choice between life and death.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in
the Cruzan decision upheld Missouri's law requiring clear and
convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's wishes before allowing her
feeding tube to be removed. 17 Florida's existing end-of-life statutes
similarly require that when a proxy makes a decision to withdraw lifeprolonging procedures for another that he do so on the basis of clear and

165. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 6.03[G][4] (reporting the "virtual unanimity
among appellate courts permitting the forgoing of medically supplied nutrition and hydration").
166. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 11-12 (Ha. 1990).
167. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a) (2003) (expressly allowing the withdrawal or
withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration from a permanently comatose individual who is
terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (2004) (including
artificial nutrition and hydration in the definition of life-prolonging procedures that may be
withheld or withdrawn by a surrogate decision-maker under VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986
(2004)).
168. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); In re Browning, 568 So.
2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990).
169. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 ("We believe Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard the
personal element of this choice through the imposition of heightened evidentiary requirements.").
170. Id. at 282.
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17 1
convincing evidence of the affected individual's wishes.
As noted above, a number of proposals in various state legislatures in
the spring of 2005 would have imposed special procedural requirements
that a proxy 172 would have to satisfy before withdrawing nutrition and
hydration from an incompetent patient but would not have made it more
difficult to remove artificial feeding if the patient was competent or had
executed a clearly drafted, specific living will. 17 3 The supporters of
such statutory changes appeared interested in imposing stricter
standards out of a concern that proxies may be more likely to
misunderstand or misrepresent the decision an incompetent person
would make about nutrition and hydration than a decision such a person
would make about other life-sustaining treatments. In fact, the bias of
these proposals suggests that the concern was that nutrition and
hydration would be withdrawn contrary to the wishes of the patient.
Legislative proposals imposing stricter requirements for withholding
or withdrawing tube feeding likely have it backwards, however.
Proxies are more likely to insert or continue a feeding tube for a patient
when that is not what the patient would want.174 As we witnessed with
the Schindlers, family
members often state that they cannot let a relative
"starve to death." 17 5 Many proxies are already biased toward the
provision of nutrition and hydration because of their own perceived role
in caring for their relative or loved one or because of their religious
beliefs that sustenance should never be withheld. 176 Some family
member proxies, for example, may seem less concerned with what their
relative may have wanted and more concerned with what177they feel are
their duties as caregivers and members of religious faiths.

171. FLA. STAT. § 765.401(3) (2004).
172. Note that under the Florida bill, these restrictions would also apply to a person
designated in an advance directive to make such decisions unless the advance directive
specifically authorized the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in the applicable circumstances.
H.B. 701, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005).
173. See supra note 155 (referring to these legislative proposals).
174. See generally Orentlicher & Callahan, supra note 42, at 395-99 (reviewing studies that
show: feeding tubes are often used when they do not benefit the patients who receive them;
physicians are more reluctant to forego feeding tubes for patients than other forms of lifesustaining treatment; and family members often feel left out of the decision-making process and
that they have no alternative but to consent to tube feeding).
175. Muriel R. Gillick, Rethinking the Role of Tube Feeding in Patients with Advanced
Dementia, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 206, 206-10 (2000) (discussing family members' views of
feeding tubes for patients with advanced dementia).
176. Id. at 208.
177. For example, in a report filed with the court, the guardian ad litem appointed under
Terri's Law related that in previous hearings, Schindler family members had stated their desire to
keep Terri alive under a number of "[n]early gruesome" scenarios. WOLFSON REPORT, supra
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There does not appear to be any solid basis for believing that most
proxies will seek to withdraw or withhold a feeding tube when the
patient for whom they speak would wish otherwise. A number of
studies reveal that a very high percentage of people, eighty-five percent
or higher, would wish to refuse a feeding tube if they were in a
permanent vegetative state, an end-stage condition, or suffered severe
brain damage. 17 8 Moreover, recent studies show that while family
members tend to authorize a feeding tube for patients with advanced

dementia, they later regret that decision as it becomes burdensome to
the patient. 179 Such patients often pull out their feeding tubes unless
they are physically restrained. 180 Studies also indicate that feeding
tubes may not even extend the lives of these patients. 18 1 These same
family members say they would not want a feeding tube if they found
themselves in similar circumstances. 182 In a study of randomly
selected, competent nursing home residents, only one third said they
would want a feeding tube if they became unable to eat because of
permanent brain damage. 18 3 This number of positive responses was
reduced by a fourth when the participants learned that they might need
to be physically restrained to accommodate the feeding tube, and would
likely be even smaller if they had been informed about growing

note 14, at 17. For example, they were asked whether they would agree to forego open heart
surgery for Terri if she had had all four limbs amputated because of gangrene. Id. They
responded that the surgery should be done. Id. The guardian ad litem relates, "Within the
testimony, as part of the hypotheticals presented, Schindler family members stated that even if
Theresa had told them of her intention to have artificial nutrition withdrawn, they would not do
it." Id.
178. Brennan's dissent in the Cruzan case cites a Colorado University Graduate School of
Public Affairs study in which 85% of those people questioned answered that they would not want
a feeding tube if they became permanently unconscious. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 312 n. 11(Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. Guido M.A. Van Rosendaal, M.D. & Marija J. Verhoef, Ph.D., Correspondence, Difficult
Decisionsfor Longterm Tube-Feeding, 161(7) CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 798, 798 (Oct. 5, 1999);
see also Howard Brody, M.D., Ph.D. et aL, Withdrawing Intensive Life-Sustaining TreatmentRecommendations for Compassionate Clinical Management, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 652, 652
(Feb. 27, 1997) (describing some of the discomforts and burdens of artificially provided nutrition
and hydration).
180. Joanne Lynn & James F. Childress, Must PatientsAlways Be Given Food and Water?, 13
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17, 18 (Oct. 1983).
181. See Orentlicher & Callahan, supra note 42, at 389-97 (citing and discussing studies that
show that many patients do not benefit from feeding tubes in terms of improvement in the quality
or length of their lives).
182. Van Rosendaal & Verhoef, supra note 179, at 798.
183. Gillick, supra note 175, at 208 (citing Linda A. O'Brien et al., Nursing Home Residents'
Preferencesfor Life-Sustaining Treatments, 274 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1775, 1775-79 (1995) and
Linda A. O'Brien et al., Tube Feeding Preferences Among Nursing Home Residents, 12 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 364, 364-71 (1997) [hereinafter O'Brien]).
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the lack of efficacy of such tubes for patients with
evidence of
84
dementia. 1
What about the charge that dying of dehydration is painful? On the
surface, this might be a reason to treat nutrition and hydration
differently than other life-prolonging treatments, because the present
interests of the patient would be in conflict with her previously formed
preferences. Of course, dying in this way would not be painful at all to
someone in a permanent vegetative state like Terri Schiavo, who could
not feel pain or even experience thirst or hunger. 185 Dying by
dehydration for someone who is terminally ill or in an end-stage
condition also does not appear to be experienced negatively. There are
numerous reports that such patients do not experience much, if any,
discomfort. 18-6 Hospice nurses report that patients who stop eating or
drinking experience a comfortable and peaceful death. 18 7 Any thirst the
patients might experience is relieved by the use of ice chips and mouth
swabs. 188 In any event, to justify closer scrutiny of decisions to
withdraw nutrition and hydration on this basis, we would need evidence
(which we do not have) that dying of dehydration is more painful than
dying from the withdrawal of other life-prolonging treatments-more
painful, for example, than dying of untreated pneumonia or respiratory,
cardiac, or renal failure.
Stricter evidentiary and procedural standards for the withdrawal and
withholding of nutrition and hydration are not likely to better elicit and
preserve the actual preferences of the patient and therefore do not
appear to be valid on that basis. Stricter restrictions on proxy decision
making for nutrition and hydration would mean that the wishes of the
incompetent patient would be less likely, rather than more likely, to be
honored, with especially profound consequences for someone in a
permanent vegetative state, whose life may be extended for decades
against her wishes.
2. Feeding as Basic Care
Is concern for patient preferences really at the heart of proposals to
make it more difficult for proxies to withhold or withdraw feeding from
their loved ones? There is very good reason to believe that, instead,
184. O'Brien, supra note 183, at 366.
185. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 1572.
186. Brody, supra note 179, at 655; Gillick, supra note 175, at 207.
187. Linda Ganzini et al., Nurses' Experiences with Hospice Patients who Refuse Food and
Fluids to Hasten Death, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 359, 363 (2003).
188. Robert M. McCann, M.D. et al., Comfort Care for Terminally Ill Patients: The
Appropriate Use of Nutrition and Hydration,272 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1263, 1265 (1994).
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supporters of such legislation think that feeding is different from other
forms of medical treatment and that it is, as Pope John Paul II stated,
"basic care" that should only rarely be withdrawn.189 This concern
signals perhaps the deepest division in the apparent prior consensus of
end-of-life law; it is the issue most unsettled by the Schiavo

controversy.
The characterization of tube feeding as "basic care" contrasts it with
"extraordinary" or "artificial" interventions or "medical treatment" that
individuals have a right to refuse. As the law in this area has evolved,
tube feeding1 90 has widely become viewed
as "artificial" and as
"medical treatment" in both court opinions 19 1 and in state statutes, 192
whereas the distinction between extraordinary and ordinary care has
largely faded in importance. Legal decisions and commentary that have
explained why such feedings are properly understood as medical
treatment focus on the following characteristics of such feedings: the
invasiveness of the procedure, especially the insertion of tubes that
requires surgery, the inherent risks and side effects, the need for special
personnel and training, special nutritional formulations, and coverage
by insurance. 19 3 Some of the cases that uphold the right to withhold or
189. Nelson, supra note 157, at 156.
190. Tube feeding includes feeding by nasogastric tubes (inserted into the esophagus through
the nose), gastrostomy tubes (tubes surgically placed into the stomach), jejunostomy tubes (tubes
surgically placed in the small intestine), and intravenous infusions (less commonly used because
of the difficulty of providing sufficient nutrition for the long-term patient).
MEISEL &
CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 6.03[G][1]. For patients in a permanent vegetative state, the
percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube is the most common. JENNETr, supra note 1,
at 88. The PEG tube procedure is minimally invasive, requiring "only two small incisions into
the abdominal wall," and has a low complication rate. Orentlicher & Callahan, supra note 42, at
391.
191. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,288-89 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
192. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (2005) (including artificial nutrition and
hydration in the definition of life-prolonging procedures that may be withheld or withdrawn by a
surrogate decision-maker under VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986).
193. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288-289 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209, 1226 (N.J. 1985)
[Alrtificial feedings such as nasogastric tubes, gastrostomies, and intravenous infusions
are significantly different from bottle-feeding or spoon-feeding they are medical
procedures with inherent risks and possible side effects, instituted by skilled healthcare providers to compensate for impaired physical functioning. Analytically, artificial
feeding by means of a nasogastric tube or intravenous infusion can be seen as
equivalent to artificial breathing by means of a respirator. Both prolong life through
mechanical means when the body is no longer able to perform a vital bodily function
on its own ....
Furthermore, while nasogastric feeding and other medical procedures
to ensure nutrition and hydration are usually well tolerated, they are not free from risks
or burdens; they have complications that are sometimes serious and distressing to the
patient.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 37

withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration define it at least in Pr by
reference to what it is presumably not, which is feeding by hand.
For
example, in the Illinois case of In re Estate of Longeway, the court
stated that there was agreement among states that allow the withholding
of artificial nutrition and hydration that such feeding is "medical
treatment and therefore
analytically distinguishable from spoon-feeding
1 95
or bottle feeding."'
The assumption of the court in In re Estate of Longeway, then, is that
though patients have a right to refuse medical treatment, and thus tube
feeding, they do not have a right to refuse feeding by hand. 19 6 Yet it is
not at all clear that this is a valid assumption, and further examination of
the issue of hand feeding, as it arose in the Schiavo case, may reveal
certain insights into how we should view tube feeding, and in particular
how we should view the argument that tube feeding is "basic care."
The guardian ad litem appointed under Terri's Law to make
recommendations to Florida Governor Jeb Bush and the court
recommended that Terri Schiavo be given swallowing tests and
swallowing therapy. 197 The implication of this recommendation was
that if Terri Schiavo could swallow and therefore take food by mouth,
the issue of the feeding tube's removal would be rendered moot. The
feeding tube could then have been removed in accordance with Terri's
proven wishes to withhold medical treatment in such circumstances (as
Florida law provides and as Michael Schiavo requested) and she could
have continued living (as her parents wished). The 198
dispute between
Michael Schiavo and the Schindlers would be resolved.
Yet even if Terri Schiavo could have been fed by mouth, which she
could not, 199 the controversy would have been no closer to resolution;
194. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 296 (Il1. 1989).
195. Id. Likewise, some state statutes clearly define artificial nutrition and hydration as that
provided through means other than by mouth, such as through tubes, catheters, or needles.
196. Id.
197. WOLFSON REPORT, supra note 14, at 29-36 (explaining swallowing tests and
recommending they be performed).
198. In fact, the guardian ad litem, Jay Wolfson, attempted to mediate this solution between
Michael Schiavo and the Schindlers, but according to his report, those efforts were ultimately
unsuccessful. Id. at 34, 39-40.
199. In the early years of her condition, when her husband Michael Schiavo aggressively
pursued various therapies for her, Terri underwent swallowing tests and swallowing therapy; they
were unsuccessful. WOLFSON REPORT, supra note 14, at 29. The circuit court with jurisdiction
over Terri's case declined to follow the guardian ad litem's recommendation, as petitioned by the
Schindlers, because Terri had previously undergone and failed such tests and because Dr.
Wolfson's recommendation was only to perform the swallowing tests if the parties agreed to be
bound by the results. In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 9, 2005) (order
denying Schindlers' petition). The court had denied a similar petition in 2000. In re Schiavo, No.
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instead, we would have had before us another set of difficult questions
to confront, namely, does a person have a right to refuse food by
mouth? Does that right exist for people who have become incompetent?
If so, how can that right be exercised? Are there any limitations on the
right?
Some may argue that, in some cases, hand feeding is "artificial" and
"medical treatment" for the same reasons that tube feeding is so. For
example, in a case such as Terri Schiavo's, hand feeding basically
would have required the careful forcing of food down her throat, if her
body could have been made to swallow reflexively. It would have been
invasive, carried the inherent risk of aspiration pneumonia, required
either special personnel or special training of caregivers, required
special nutritional formulations, and would likely have been covered by
insurance. 2 0 It would not have resembled the more typical image of
hand feeding, as when a bowl of chicken soup is spoon-fed to an ailing
patient who is able to open his mouth to receive it.
The answer to the question of how to consider feeding by hand is not
to be found, however, in likening it or distinguishing it from medical
treatment or tube feeding. The basis for the constitutional, common
law, and moral right to refuse tube feeding is not that it is medical
treatment, but that tube feeding against the patient's will is an intrusion
into the bodily integrity of the individual. 20 1 Medical treatment given
without patient consent is a battery, in common law terms, and a
violation of one's liberty interests in constitutional terms. The critical
issue is not whether a particular "touching" or "intrusion" is "medical
20 2
treatment" but whether it is unwanted, whether it is in a sense forced.
90-2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 2000).
200. See In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 2000) (order denying
Schindlers' petition). The order relates the testimony of Dr. Barnhill on the issue of whether Terri
Schiavo could be fed by hand:
Dr. Barnhill testified that in his opinion attempting oral nutrition would result in
aspiration with insufficient nutrition passing to the stomach to maintain her, thereby
prolonging her death, if the feeding tube were withdrawn. He testified that such
aspiration would lead to infection, fever, cough and ultimately pneumonia. This would
require suctioning which likely would be fatal.
Id.
201. See e.g,, Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287-89 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("As the Court notes, the liberty interest in refusing medical treatment flows from
decisions involving the State's invasions into the body.").
202. In Cruzan, the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred
from our prior decisions." Id. at 278. In support of this inference, the court invoked Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, which did not deal with medical treatment per se, but with government-imposed
vaccinations. Id. at 278-79 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)). The
Court also referred to cases analyzing searches and seizures that were thought to implicate
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But if that is so, then unwanted hand feeding can also constitute an
intrusion of bodily integrity and thus can be rejected by a competent
patient. And if a competent patient can reject it, then an incompetent
patient can also reject it, through his or her proxy or by advance
directive.
There may be reasons to treat hand feeding differently from tube
feeding, but it is difficult to describe any such reasons under our current
constitutional standards for refusing unwanted treatment. At the same
time, the thought of not attempting to hand feed an elderly patient with
dementia is disturbing in ways that not placing a feeding tube in her
stomach is not-even if both forms of treatment were clearly rejected in
a duly executed living will.
Why is this so?
Some possible
explanations may be: (1) there are limits on what may be asked of
caregivers-just as we insist that caregivers be allowed to preserve the
hygiene of the patient and her surroundings, we might insist that
caregivers be allowed to offer basic sustenance in the form of hand
feeding; (2) hand feeding might be experienced as comfort care by the
patient in ways that tube feeding is not, either in the social relationship
established through the process of hand feeding or through the
pleasurable sensation of taking in food; (3) a patient may indicate that
she desires hand feeding by appearing interested in food, by opening her
mouth, and so on, so that we might say that these present actions trump
her earlier declaration or we might say that she is not presently
incapable of making the decision to consume food and so her advance
directive is not operative on that point.
Of these three concerns, only the first might have been operative in
Terri Schiavo's case, because even if she had been a candidate for hand
feeding, she could neither experience the intake of food nor indicate a
desire for it. That would leave only concern for her caregivers to weigh
against her desire (as expressed by her proxy) not to continue living in
her present condition. As between the two, respect for her autonomy
substantial liberty interests. Id. (citing Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957)). In fact,
the Court's discussion of the issue of the existence of a constitutional right to avoid unwanted
medical treatment begins with the statement, "At common law, even the touching of one person
by another without consent and without legal justification was a battery." Id. at 269. The Court
quotes the 1891 case of Union Pacific Ry. Co v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), for the
proposition that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id. at
269. It is this "notion of bodily integrity," the Court tells us, that "has been embodied in the

requirement that informed consent is generally required for medical treatment." Id. The Court
further quotes Justice Cardozo's famous statement from Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30 (1914), that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body." Id. at 269.
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should be sufficient to outweigh the interests of her caregivers. I would
conclude, then, that even if Terri Schiavo could have been fed by
mouth, that she should not have been. If her wish would be not to
continue living in a permanent vegetative state, and thus to reject
treatment that prolonged her life in that state, then her wish should not
be overridden by society's and her caregivers' feelings of their duties to
feed her.
Now what, if anything, does the consideration of the issue of hand
feeding tell us that we can apply to tube feeding? Most immediately, it
reveals the inadequacy of labeling feeding as "basic care" and assuming
that that label answers questions about when and whether it must be
provided or can be refused. Whether or not tube feeding is "medical
care" or "basic care" is not really the question at all, because hand
feeding falls rather neatly into the "basic care" box and yet it is not clear
that hand feeding cannot be refused. In fact, it probably can be, at least
in some situations, such as a permanent vegetative state.
Further consideration of the issue of feeding, both by tube and by
hand, is necessary, especially after the Schiavo case's revelation of the
lack of national consensus on the issue of feeding generally. First, we
need to unpack what "care" means rather than categorize different forms
of treatment as medical or basic care. In this regard, attention should be
paid not only to the ends achieved through the provision of care (such as
prolongation of life), but to how the individual receives or perceives the
treatment that is giver--whether it is taken in as care or not. If feeding
is not experienced as care by the recipient, then it would not appear to
be any different from other forms of unwanted treatment rejected on the
basis of the patient's former autonomy.
The possibility of rejecting hand feeding by advance directive may
unravel our current understanding, some may say "myth," that the right
to refuse treatment is based in bodily integrity rather than autonomy. If
an individual does have, in certain situations at least, a right to refuse
hand feeding, then he might be able to execute an advance directive that
refused hand feeding and have that advance directive honored. But
what is the advance directive really saying? It seems that it would be
saying, "If I end up in condition x, I want to die," rather than saying, "I
reject the intrusion of caregivers offering me food." If, as this example
illustrates, the right to refuse treatment is based in autonomy rather than
bodily integrity, then the right looks more like a "right to die," and the
reasoning behind the Supreme Court's rejection of a constitutional right
to physician-assisted suicide is more difficult to accept.
In the physician-assisted suicide case of Washington v. Glucksberg,
the Court explained the Cruzan decision as, at most, standing for the

340

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 37

proposition that there was a right to refuse bodily intrusions, not a right
to determine the circumstances of one's death. 2 0 Accordingly, Cruzan
provided little support for a right to assistance in hastening death.
While the Constitution may protect a person's right to reject unwanted
life-sustaining treatment (because such treatment would infringe on
bodily integrity), it did not provide a person with a right to seek
treatment that may hasten death (which would be based in autonomy).
But this reasoning is rendered questionable by consideration of the
issue of hand feeding. If in unpacking the problem of hand feeding we
realize that what a right to refuse unwanted treatment really furthers is a
person's right to die, because it is life in the present condition that is
rejected rather than burdensome or intrusive treatments, then the right
does look like it is grounded as much or more in autonomy than bodily
integrity. Recognizing the autonomy basis for the right to refuse
treatment may require a reexamination of the question of a right to
2 4
physician-assisted
suicide,
0 as well as provide impetus for recognition
of other rights based
in autonomy
or self-determination.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The law of end-of-life decision making is due for reexamination. The
case of Terri Schiavo makes that abundantly clear. Crucial questions
remain unresolved: among them, the proper role of surrogate decision
making and the amount of discretion allowed to surrogates; the rights of
those who are severely brain damaged but not permanently vegetative to
refuse life-sustaining treatment; and the permissibility of withdrawing
nutrition and hydration as compared to other forms of treatment.
But it is not just Terri Schiavo's case that signals the need for
reexamination. The reason it- captured so much attention and concern
can be explained in part by the unease that many people feel about how
these decisions are made. It is also indicative of the growing vitalist
movement in the country, although it is unclear whether that movement
has actually been embraced by more people in recent years or has
simply become more visible. The questions are complex and important;
the answers the law provides will have profound and lasting effects on
people's lives. While the law is certainly ripe for reexamination, it is
203. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725-26 (1997).
204. Rejecting a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide may still be appropriate, but
the explanation for that rejection would need re-evaluation. See Lois Shepherd, Looking Forward
with the Right of Privacy, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 251, 281 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
rejection of a constitutional right to physician assisted suicide is consistent with the Court's prior
jurisprudence, but not simply because of the distinction between rights based in bodily integrity
and those based in autonomy or self-determination).
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not due for hasty, reactionary revision. Changes to our law of end-oflife decision making must be preceded by careful, informed, and
responsible inquiry.

